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Article
From Al-Qaida in 2001 to ISIL in 2015:
The Security Council’s Decisions on Terrorism
and Their Impact on the Right to Self-Defense
Against Autonomous Non-State Actors
Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez
“The fortunes of war more than any other are liable to
frequent fluctuations,” said Don Quixote. Prominent voices
certainly embraced this logic regarding a right to self-defense
against autonomous non-State actors shortly after 9/11,1 mainly

Senior lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Waikato, New Zealand aalvarez@waikato.ac.nz. This Article covers the Security Council’s decisions on
the topic until November 25, 2015. The author is grateful to the Faculty of Law
of the University of Waikato for its significant support. Earlier versions of this
Article were presented at the Conference, “The UN at 70: Guaranteeing
Security and Justice” (The Hague, 2015); the International Organizations
Workshop organized by the American Society of International Law (Columbia
Law School, 2014); the 2014 Conference of the Australian and New Zealand
Society of International Law (Canberra, Australia); the 2014 Beeby Colloquium
organized by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(Wellington, New Zealand); and the Annual Conference of the Canadian Council
of International Law (Ottawa, 2013). The author is grateful to Kristen Boon,
Sarah Dadush, Joanna Harrington, Claire Breen, Melissa Durkee, Ruwanthika
Gunaratne, David Gartner, Julian Arato, Andrew Woods, David Zaring, Ben
Heath, Alexander Gillespie, and Ben Saul for their valuable comments. All
errors are the author’s alone.
1. The label “right to self-defense against autonomous non-State actors”
means the right to self-defense against armed attacks or threats thereof coming
from autonomous non-State actors and aimed at the territory of the State from
which they operate (hereinafter “innocent States”). Traditionally, autonomous
non-State actors are those whose actions cannot be attributed to a third State,
based on the customary rule embodied in Article 8 of the International Law
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, as interpreted by the
International Court of Justice. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115 (June
27). However, as this Article will illustrate below in Section IX, such analysis
will be made in light of the Security Council’s own rules of attribution, which it
has put in place in the domain of threats to international peace and security
caused by terrorist acts. As to the customary rule, see id.; Application of the
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as a result of Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001) adopted by the
Security Council in the aftermath of the infamous terrorist
attacks.2 Others argued that these resolutions had lowered the
threshold of attribution to States of actions carried out by nonState actors, in the sense that States would be held responsible
for armed attacks consummated by terrorist groups that the
former had either actively or passively supported.3
However, the International Court of Justice (the “Court” or
“ICJ”) held in its advisory opinion in Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory4 in
2004 that Article 51 “recognizes the existence of an inherent
right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State
against another State.”5 This was the Court’s response to Israel’s

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn.
& Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 399–400 (Feb.
26); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 146 (Dec. 19).
2. See Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual
Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 769, 774 (2012); Theresa
Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post9∕11, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 248 (2011); W. Michael Reisman & Andrea
Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100
AM. J. INT’L L. 525, 527–32 (2006); Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to
Transnational Terrorism Under the Jus ad Bellum: A Normative Framework,
56 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2008). To be sure, not all commentators shared this
view post-9/11; see, e.g., CHRISTINE GRAY, The Charter Limitations on the Use
of Force: Theory and Practice, in UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND
WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 86, 97 (Vaugham
Lowe et al. eds., 2008); Antonio Cassese, Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some
Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 996
(2001); Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 537, 546–47 (2004); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Dangerous Departures, 107 AM.
J. INT’L L. 380, 382 (2013); Dire Tladi, The Nonconsenting Innocent State: The
Problem with Bethlehem’s Principle 12, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 570, 575 (2013).
3. See Thomas Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After
Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 607, 610 (2003); see also Iain Scobbie, Words My Mother
Never Taught Me:”In Defense of the International Court,” 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 76,
81 (2005).
4. Legal Consequences of the Construction of Wall in Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136 (July 9).
5. Id. ¶ 139; see U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.”).
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invocation of Resolutions 13686 and 1373.7 Nonetheless, the
Court said nothing on whether Resolutions 1368 and 1373
contained a standard of attribution different from that of
customary international law. At the same time, Judges Higgins,
Buergenthal, and Kooijmans were of a different view: the scope
of Article 51 is not limited to attacks carried out by States.8
Some prominent voices did not much heed the Court as to
the issue of autonomous non-State actors. For instance, Sir
Daniel Bethlehem argued that “it is by now reasonably clear and
accepted that states have a right of self-defense against attacks
by non-state actors—as reflected, for example, in UN Security
Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 of 2001, adopted following
the 9∕11 attacks . . . .”9
Has the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant (“ISIL”) and the Al Nusrah Front (“ANF”) made
discussions on the existence of the right to self-defense against
autonomous non-State actors irrelevant? Apparently, yes. A
swift analysis would be as follows: the United States and United
Kingdom invoked the right to self-defense against Al-Qaida back
in 2001;10 the Security Council mentioned the inherent right to
self-defense in Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001);11 the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France invoked the right to
self-defense in 2014 and 2015 in response to ISIL;12 and the
Council enacted Resolution 2249 (2015), calling upon UN
members to take all necessary measures against this terrorist

6. S.C. Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
7. S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
8. See Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. at ¶ 33 (separate opinion by Higgins, R.);
id. ¶ 6 (separate opinion by Buergenthal, T.); id. ¶ 35 (separate opinion by
Kooijmans, P.); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELFDEFENCE 229–30 (2012); Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall
Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit From the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 64 (2005).
9. Bethlehem, supra note 2, at 774; see also DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at
230.
10. See Press Release, Security Council, Press Statement on Terrorist
Threats by Security Council President, U.N. Press Release SC/7167 (Oct. 8,
2001) [hereinafter Press Statement on Terrorist Threats].
11. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 6; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 7.
12. See Marc Weller, Permanent Imminence of Armed Attacks: Resolution
2249 (2015) and the Right to Self Defence Against Designated Terrorist Groups,
EJIL: TALK!: BLOG OF THE EUR. J. INT’L L. (Nov. 25, 2015),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/permanent-imminence-of-armed-attacks-resolution2249-2015-and-the-right-to-self-defence-against-designated-terroristgroups/#more-13871.
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group.13 The right of self-defense against autonomous non-State
actors would then be well established under Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter (“Charter”) as a result of the Council’s
decisions. Despite the allure of this chain of events, this
proposition does not hold true. To be sure, this is not to say that
the understanding of this provision is the same now as it was in
1945. This would simply ignore the reality the world is facing as
a result of the threat that autonomous non-State actors pose for
international peace and security. To prove this conclusion, this
Article will follow an approach highlighted in the most recent
evaluation of the Charter carried out by Simma, Khan, Nolte,
and Paulus.14
In their assessment of Article 51, Nolte and Randelzhofer
offered an additional layer of analysis regarding its
interpretation. They simply but acutely recalled how the
Charter, in particular Article 51, had to be interpreted as a
treaty in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (“VCLT”). Thus, they opened the way for the evaluation
of subsequent practice by expressing:
[T]he UN Charter is to be interpreted according to the
general rules of treaty interpretation which are codified
in Arts 31–33 VCLT . . . In principle, the rules of treaty
interpretation and on the sources of international law do
not exclude the possibility that Art. 51 is reinterpreted,
including on the basis of subsequent practice.
Theoretically it is even possible that an additional
exception to the general prohibition of the use of force
could develop alongside Art. 51 by way of superseding
customary international law. In view, however, of the
fundamental importance of the right to self-defense for
the Charter system of collective security, the conditions
for the recognition of any significant reinterpretation of,
or superseding exception to, Art 51 are strict.15

13. S.C. Res. 2249, ¶ 5 (Nov. 20, 2015).
14. See Georg Nolte & Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in 2 THE CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1397 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed.
2012).
15. Id. ¶ 4. Subsequent decisions and practices within international
organizations are used as elements in interpreting their constitutive treaties.
See JOSE ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 87–92
(2005); JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL
LAW 96–103 (2002); Jan Wouters & Philip De Man, International Organizations
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It is on this basis that I suggest the Wall Opinion cannot be seen
as preventing the Security Council, the General Assembly, or
UN members from reinterpreting Article 51 through subsequent
decisions and practice. Moreover, there is room for an
interpretation of Article 51 that this provision does not limit its
scope to attacks by States, as Judges Higgins, Buergenthal, and
Kooijmans suggested in their separate opinions and declaration
to the Court’s opinion.16 Consequently, what the Wall Opinion
does not say, in the present author’s view and in accordance with
the VCLT, is that Article 51 excludes per se the existence of a
right to self-defense against such actors. However, what the Wall
opinion can be inferred to say is that this until July 2004, this
practice—in particular the Council’s—had not altered the
traditional understanding of the scope of Article 51 to cover
armed attacks by autonomous non-State actors.
After Wall, those arguing that the right to self-defense
against autonomous non-State actors has crystallized cannot
base their claims solely on a reading of the text of Article 51 and
of Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which the Court did not embrace
in 2004. To be rigorous and convincing, the statement needs to
be based on subsequent United Nations decisions and practice.
The same can be said of the creation of a new standard of
attribution to States of non-State actors’ actions in the domain
of terrorism.

as Law-Makers, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 190, 192–94 (Jan Klabbers & Asa Wallendahl eds., 2011); see
also Whaling in Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan/N.Z.), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep.
226, ¶¶ 46–47, 137 (Mar. 31). There have been discussions during the Security
Council’s deliberations on the potential amendment character of particular
draft resolutions. To be sure, the issue is Janus-faced. What some States might
consider as an amendment to a Charter provision, others might not. In this
regard, see the discussion that took place during the adoption of Resolution 255
(1968), which referred to measures to safeguard non-nuclear-weapons States
parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. U.N. DEP’T
OF POLITICAL AND SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF
THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1966–68, Chapter XI at 217–23,
U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/1/Add.5, U.N. Sales No. F.71 VII.1 (1971) [hereinafter
REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SEC. COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1966–
68]. However, the point here is not whether the Security Council’s decisions and
practices can introduce amendments to Article 51, but whether these decisions
have adjusted the understanding of this provision to reflect new realities.
16. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of Wall in Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 33 (July 9)
(separate opinion by Higgins, R.); id. ¶ 6 (separate opinion by Buergenthal, T.);
id. ¶ 35 (separate opinion by Kooijmans, P.).
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This Article explores to the fullest extent possible Nolte and
Randelzhofer’s approach17 and examines the Security Council’s
decisions and practice after Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001),
and until Resolution 2249 (2015)—exhorting members to take
all necessary means against ISIL.18 The Article will illustrate
the following main conclusions after an evaluation of 37
resolutions, 48 presidential statements enacted and issued by
the Council, and 156 press statements made by its members:
(i)

Between 2002 and November 2015 (Resolution
2249), there was no explicit subsequent decision
or practice related to the right to self-defense
against autonomous non-State actors;

(ii)

With the exception of Resolution 2249, the
Council has consistently chosen to develop
multilateral tools unrelated to the use of force to
overcome terrorist threats in its 85 decisions;

(iii)

There is some evidence of what could be labelled
as “implicit subsequent decisions and practice”
related to the use of force in self-defense against
autonomous non-State actors from 2001 until
right before Resolution 2249. This practice,
however, combined with Resolutions 1268 and
1373, has not been enough to expand the right to
self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter
against such terrorist entities;

(iv)

Contrary to the lack of decisions regarding
Article 51 in this realm, the Council has made

17. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Hakimi and Cogan offer a
different framework of analysis from the one explored here. Although the
present author does not fully share their approach, their article constitutes an
important contribution to the literature. See Monica Hakimi & Jacob Katz
Cogan, The Two Codes on the Use of Force, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 257, 257 (2016).
18. Nolte & Randelzhofer, supra note 14, ¶ 37 (concluding that “the
preferable view seems to be that attacks by organized groups need to be
attributed to a State in order to enable the affected State to exercise its right to
self-defence”). This conclusion does not render the present Article irrelevant, for
Nolte and Randelzhofer highlighted the argument of expansion of Article 51
through subsequent decisions and practices without embarking upon an
evaluation of such decisions.
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four explicit references to this provision during
the same period in a different context;
(v)

The International Court was right with its
cautious approach in the Wall Opinion, which
reflects the Council’s perspective from 2002 to
2015;

(vi)

In 1998 the Council began creating a new
standard of attribution to States of non-State
actors’ actions in the domain of terrorism, which
the Council applied to the 9/11 attacks and has
repeatedly reaffirmed over the said period. The
standard is different from that of customary
international law: actions by non-State actors
that do not meet the customary standard can
meet the Council’s standards, be attributed to
States, and may trigger self-defensive
responses;

(vii)

As a result of this newly-created standard, the
Council
has
indirectly
expanded
the
applicability of Article 51 to respond to armed
terrorist attacks; and

(viii)

In Resolution 2249 the Council, for the first
time, tacitly endorsed self-defensive action
against an autonomous non-State actor—ISIL in
Syria and Iraq—but the resolution does not go
beyond that. 19

19. The decisions adopted by the Security Council in the domain of threats
to international peace and security in 2016 do not change this conclusion. In
effect, the Council issued two resolutions on this topic. Resolution 2309 dealt
with measures aimed at preventing terrorist attacks against the global aviation
system. See S.C. Res. 2309 (Sept. 22, 2016). Security Council Resolution 2322
expanded measures against ISIL and was aimed at curbing its ability to recruit
foreign terrorist fighters and to have access to funds and financial assets. See
S.C. Res. 2322 (Dec. 12, 2016). So did the following two statements from the
Security Council President. First, the presidential statement of May 11, 2016,
requested the Counter Terrorism Committee to present a proposal to the
Council for a comprehensive international framework to counter ISIL’s
narratives encouraging the commission of terrorist attacks. See U.N. President
of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/PRST/2016/6 (May 11, 2016). The second presidential statement took place on
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Essentially, the Council’s decisions and practices from 2001
to 2015 evidence that under the legal terms of the UN Charter,
a State that has been the object of an armed attack by a nonState actor—other than ISIL in Syria and Iraq—or is under
imminent threat of such attack, needs to identify if the attack
can be attributed to a State under the Council’s norms of
attribution in the domain of terrorism. If not, the attacked State
needs to secure, as a matter of law, the innocent State’s consent
to carry out self-defensive action in the former’s territory under
the well-established principle of sovereignty and territorial
integrity enshrined in the Charter, or it needs the Security
Council’s endorsement or a Chapter VII authorization for the
given self-defensive action.20 Merely the existence of an armed
attack or imminent threat by an autonomous non-State actor is
not enough to trigger lawful self-defensive action under the UN
Charter on the basis of the Council’s subsequent decisions and
practices.
I. SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS AND PRACTICES
AND HOW TO INTERPRET THEM
The Security Council operates through a diverse set of
instruments: binding resolutions; non-binding resolutions; and
presidential statements.21 However, it is important to note that
the label “presidential statements” is slightly inaccurate, as the
statement comes directly from the Council in a formal meeting,
after informal consultations of the whole involving negotiations
of each paragraph, and it is merely read out by the president.22
More importantly, these statements constitute decisions of the
May 13, 2016, and was related to Boko Haram. The Council commended the
governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria for their regional efforts
against this terrorist group. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2016/7 (May 13, 2016).
20. The U.N. Charter establishes only two exceptions to the prohibition of
the use of force: the Council’s enforcement actions pursuant to Chapter VII, and
the right to individual and collective self-defense set forth in Art. 51. See Nolte
& Randelzhofer, supra note 14, ¶ 3.
21. See generally U.N. President of the S.C., Note dated July 26, 2010, U.N.
Doc. S/2010/507 (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter U.N. President of the S.C July 2010
Note] (explaining that the U.N. Security Council uses various forms of
documentation to communicate their initiatives).
22. See Stefan Talmon, The Statements by the President of the Security
Council, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 419, 419 (2003); Michael C. Wood, Security
Council Working Methods and Procedure: Recent Developments, 45 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 150, 154 n.12 (1996).
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Security Council under Article 27 of the Charter,23 a conclusion
supported by States’ practice and the UN Secretariat.24 In terms
of ranking, Sievers and Daws say, “there is no hierarchy among
Council decisions created because of the format in which they
are ‘published.’”25 So, a binding decision can exist in a
presidential statement, too.26 It all depends on the substantive
content.27 However, there is another reality highlighted by these
authors: “[b]ecause of the common perception that a resolution
‘carries more weight’ . . . than a presidential statement, the
Council has tended to publish all of its major operational
decisions as resolutions.”28 In practice, no Chapter VII decision
has been imparted in a presidential statement.29 In addition to
these decisions, the Council also issues annual reports, which
are sent to the UN General Assembly by virtue of Article 24(3)
of the Charter and which are approved by all of its members.30
Finally, there is another type of practice worth mentioning:
statements to the press. They are made orally by the Security
Council President (the “President”), on behalf of the members of
the Council and on the basis of general guidelines determined
after informal consultations.31 These statements, however, do
not constitute decisions under Article 2732 but are still
considered important by the Council itself, which has regulated
their discussion process33 and included them among the
information available to the public on the Council’s website.34 In

23. See Andreas Zimmermann, Article 27, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 871, ¶ 73 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed.
2012).
24. See Talmon, supra note 22, at 448.
25. LORAINE SIEVERS & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL 375 (4th ed. 2014).
26. See id. at 381. These authors also present evidence of the Council’s
practice of events of binding nature of presidential statements and Notes of the
President. See id. at 375–76.
27. See id. at 374. But see Talmon, supra note 22, at 452.
28. SIEVERS & DAWS, supra note 25, at 376–78.
29. See id. at 378.
30. See U.N. President of the S.C. July Note, supra note 21, at 12–15.
31. See Wood, supra note 22, at 154; Talmon, supra note 22, at 430.
32. See Zimmermann, supra note 23, at 74; Talmon, supra note 22, at 448–
49.
33. See U.N. President of the S.C. July Note, supra note 21, at 9, ¶ 42.
34. Links to the Security Council’s press releases can be found, in reverse
chronological order, at in the main webpage of the United Nations Security
Council. See U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ (last visited
April 4, 2017).
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any case, they constitute declarations by the members of the
Council regarding particular topics.
The issue then is how to interpret these subsequent
decisions and practices made by the Council when assessing
whether they have achieved expansion of Article 51. The
International Court first expressed in the Advisory Opinion in
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970),
The language of a resolution of the Security Council
should be carefully analysed . . . having regard to the
terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions
leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in
general, all circumstances that might assist in
determining the legal consequences . . . .35
Most recently, the Court expressed in its advisory opinion in
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo:
The interpretation of Security Council resolutions may
require the Court to analyse [sic] statements by
representatives of members of the Security Council made
at the time of their adoption, other resolutions of the
Security Council on the same issue, as well as the
subsequent practice of relevant United Nations organs
and of States affected by those given resolutions.36
As can be seen, the Court highlights “other resolutions on the
same subject” as elements to be taken into consideration at the
time of interpretation of specific resolutions. Presidential
statements can also be used to interpret Security Council
resolutions as part of the subsequent practice the Court
mentioned in the Kosovo advisory opinion. In fact, the Court

35. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ¶ 114 (June 21).
36. Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403,
¶ 94 (July 22).
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used statements of this nature when interpreting the applicable
resolutions in this opinion.37
Finally, the fact that the International Court has said that
other resolutions on the same issue are relevant for the purpose
of interpretations of particular resolutions has an impact on the
scope of the subsequent practice to be assessed for the purpose
of the inquiry carried out here. Indeed, the Council included
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 within the topic “threats to
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,”38 so
37. See id. ¶ 91.
38. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 6; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 7. It is
important to note that, despite the fact that the Council has rendered 85
decisions under the label “threats to international peace and security caused by
terrorist acts,” there is no general definition of the term “terrorism” in
international law. The closest the Security Council has come to a definition is
provided in Resolution 1566, where the Council stated:
[C]riminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent
to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the
purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group
of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as
defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of
a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other
similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if
not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties
consistent with their grave nature.
S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 3 (Oct. 8, 2004); see also Michael Wood, The Role of the UN
Security Council in Relation to the Use of Force Against Terrorists, in COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER:
MEETING THE CHALLENGES 317, 323 (Larissa Van den Kerik & Nico Schrijver
eds., 2013). However, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon defined, for the first
time, terrorism in international law in the following terms:
On the basis of treaties, UN resolutions and the legislative and judicial
practice of States, there is convincing evidence that a customary rule
of international law has evolved on terrorism in time of peace,
requiring the following elements: (i) the intent (dolus) of the
underlying crime and (ii) the special intent (dolus specialis) to spread
fear or coerce authority; (iii) the commission of a criminal act, and (iv)
that the terrorist act be transnational.
Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable
Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 3
(Special Trib. for Lebanon Feb. 16, 2011). On the topic of a definition of
terrorism, see BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
(2006) (explaining that there is no one absolute, correct definition of terrorism
due to the word’s subjective and political nature); ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 264–67 (2010); Marcello Di Filippo, Terrorist Crimes
and International Co-operation: Critical Remarks on the Definition and
Inclusion of Terrorism in the Category of International Crimes, 19 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 533, 539, 546 (2008); Ben Saul, Terrorism as a Transnational Crime, in
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for the purpose of identifying subsequent decisions and practices
by the Council related to the right to self-defense against
autonomous non-State actors that could have expanded Article
51, this Article will assess 37 resolutions, 48 presidential
statements, and 156 press statements catalogued by the Council
as being made under the said label over the period 2001–15. This
Article will also look at 13 Annual Reports to the General
Assembly issued by the Council, as well as the Repertoire of
Practice of the Security Council concerning Article 51.39 Only
after reviewing all of these decisions can an interpreter conclude
whether or not the subsequent practice has expanded the scope
of Article 51 of the Charter to cover self-defensive actions against
armed attacks from autonomous non-State actors and whether
or not the subsequent practice has created or reaffirmed a
particular standard of attribution to States of acts performed by
non-State actors in the domain of terrorism.40
II. THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S DECISIONS AND
PRACTICES IN RESPONSE TO THE 9/11
TERRORIST ATTACKS
Resolution 1368 condemned the 9/11 attacks, recognized
“the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in
accordance with the Charter,”41 and called on States to work
together “to bring to justice perpetrators, organizers and
sponsors of these terrorist attacks . . . . ”42 On September 21,
2001, the President issued a press statement on behalf of the
members of the Council, in which he provided a broader context
HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 394 (N. Boister & R. Currie eds.,
2015).
39. The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council covers the period
from 1946 to 2011. See The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml (last visited
Mar. 28, 2017).
40. This Article has also included a review of Notes by the President of the
Security Council regarding threats to international peace and security caused
by terrorist acts. There was nothing relevant in them.
41. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 6, pmbl. ¶ 3.
42. See id. ¶ 3. On September 13, 2001, the President of the Security
Council issued a note acknowledging the receipt of communications sent by the
representatives of Australia, Belgium (on behalf of the European Union), Brazil,
Cuba, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia, and Yugoslavia, in
which the terrorist attacks were condemned. See U.N. President of the S.C.,
Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/2001/864 (Sept. 13,
2001).
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to Resolution 1368; in particular, he highlighted 12
international conventions dealing with different dimensions of
terrorism and anticipated the adoption of resolutions of a
general nature, which in effect the Council adopted when it
issued Resolution 1373.43
Resolution 1373 (2001) reaffirmed the inherent right to selfdefense44 as well as “the need to combat by all means, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.”45 The
resolution also provided that:
[A]ll States shall:
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or
passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts,
including by suppressing recruitment of members of
terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons
to terrorists;
...
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support,
or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens . . . .46
In addition, Resolution 1373 called on “States to work together
urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts . . . .”47 It
mandated States to criminalize the willful provision or collection
of funds by their nationals to be used for terrorist purposes,
ordered the freeze of assets of persons involved in terrorist
actions, and called for the prohibition of nationals to make funds
43. See Press Release, Security Council, Note by President of Security
Council, U.N. Press Release S/2001/864 (Sept. 29, 2001).
44. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 7, pmbl. ¶ 4. In addition to the United
Kingdom and the United States, Canada, France, Australia, Germany, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Belgium (on behalf of General Affairs
Council of the European Union), Norway, Egypt, Malaysia, and Chile (on behalf
of State members of the Rio Group) supported the invocation of Article 51 under
the circumstances. See U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL AND SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS,
REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT
2000–03, Chapter XI at 1005–06, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/1/Add.14, U.N. Sales No.
[not provided] (2011) [hereinafter REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 2000–03].
45. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 7, pmbl. ¶ 5.
46. Id. ¶¶ 2(a), 2(c).
47. Id. pmbl. ¶ 7.
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available to those involved in terrorist actions. Resolution 1373
also called upon UN members to become parties to conventions
related to terrorism, created a Committee of the Security
Council to monitor implementation of the resolution, and
ordered States to report to the Committee on the steps they had
taken in this direction.
In essence, Resolution 1373 has both unilateral and
multilateral dimensions, but this does not mean that the two
natures are of the same degree. In fact, the unilateral dimension
in Resolution 1373 is present in its preamble only, while the
multilateral character is present both in the preamble and, more
importantly, in the operative part of the resolution. This is a
distinction worth keeping in mind.
On October 8, 2001, the President released a press
statement on behalf of the members of the Council closely
related to Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001). In it, the President
stated:
I might recall that the Security Council reacted to the
attacks of 11 September, first through resolution 1368,
and then through resolution 1373, which took direct aim
at the financing and support of international terrorism.
The members of the Council are determined to see the
full implementation of these resolutions.
The members of the Security Council took note of the
letters that the representatives of the United States and
of the United Kingdom sent yesterday to the President of
the Security Council, in accordance with Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, in which they state that the
action was taken in accordance with the inherent right
of individual and collective self-defence following the
terrorist attacks in the United States of 11 September
2001.48
One month after the attacks, the members of the Council made
a press statement in which they announced the appointment of
the members of the Committee that Resolution 1373 had
established to monitor its implementation.49
48. See Press Statement on Terrorist Threats, supra note 10.
49. See Press Release, Security Council, Press Statement on ‘Terrorism
Committee’ by President of Security Council, U.N. Press Release SC/7163 (Oct.
4, 2001).
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Another decision by the Council adopted in relation to the
9/11 attacks was Resolution 1377 (2001).50 The decision
contained a declaration by the Council on the global effort
against terrorism, recalled, among others, the 9/11 resolutions,51
and declared that international terrorism was a serious threat
to peace and security and was contrary to the purposes and
principles of the Charter.52 The resolution affirmed that active
participation and collaboration of UN members, in accordance
with the Charter, was essential to combat terrorism.53 The
Council also began setting the basis for the strengthening of the
Counter-Terrorism Committee (“CTC”), first, by recognizing
that States may need assistance to implement Resolution 1373,
and second, by authorizing the CTC to explore ways to provide
it.54
Finally, the Council issued a press statement
commemorating the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, in
which it endorsed the actions carried out in self-defense by the
United States and the United Kingdom against the Taliban and
Al-Qaida:
The international community has responded to the
atrocities
of
11
September
with
unyielding
determination. A broad coalition of States has taken
action against the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and their
supporters. It did so in defence of common values and
common security. Consistent with the high purposes of
this institution and the provisions of the United Nations
Charter, the coalition continues to pursue those
responsible.55
Despite the fact that the Court just mentioned Resolutions
1368 and 1373 in the Wall opinion, these resolutions, plus the
presidential statements already mentioned, are the decisions by
the Council that the Court implicitly regarded as insufficient to
expand Article 51 against autonomous non-State actors.

50. See S.C. Res. 1377 (Nov. 12, 2001).
51. See id. ¶ 3.
52. See id. ¶ 4.
53. See id. ¶ 9.
54. See id. ¶¶ 14–15.
55. U.N. Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security
Council, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2002/25 (Sept. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Statement
by the President of the Security Council on Sept. 11, 2002].
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Before proceeding, note that for the right to self-defense
against autonomous non-State actors to exist, there is an
important trade-off: namely, the territorial integrity of the State
from which the autonomous non-State actor operates, whose
consent is not required. This is because the self-defending State,
by virtue of the existence of the right, would not need to get the
State’s consent prior to carrying out the self-defensive action.
Differently put, with the existence of an armed attack, the right
to self-defense would trump the right to territorial integrity of
the State from which the non-State actor operates. The right to
self-defense against such acts would exist under Article 51 only
once UN members recognized an exception to the right to
territorial integrity of the non-consenting State. The coexistence
of the two rights would exist only in the event of such consent.
The sole exception, as will be seen, is endorsement or Chapter
VII authorization by the Security Council to take all necessary
measures against an autonomous non-State actor.
III.

THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST ISIL
AND RESOLUTION 2249 (2015)

Given the impression that Resolution 2249 may have
confirmed the existence of the right to self-defense against
autonomous non-State actors—and because Article 51 had been
invoked against ISIL by Iraq and the United States since 2014,56
with the opposition of Russia and China, which claimed that all
military operations in Syria required its consent57—it is
56. See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014 from the
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sep. 23,
2014).
57. See Ben Blanchard, China Gives Cautious Response to Obama’s Islamic
State Call, REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2014, 4:33 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/09/11/iraq-crisis-china-idUSL3N0RC23K20140911 (statement of
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying) (“China opposes all
forms of terrorism, and upholds that the international community must jointly
cooperate to strike against terrorism, including supporting efforts by relevant
countries to maintain domestic security and stability[.] . . . At the same time,
we also uphold that in the international fight against terrorism, international
law should be respected and the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of relevant nations should also be respected . . . .”). For Russia’s
statement, see Ian Black & Dan Roberts, Isis Air Strikes: Obama’s Plan
Condemned by Syria, Russia and Iran, GUARDIAN (Sep. 12, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/11/assad-moscow-tehrancondemn-obama-isis-air-strike-plan (statement of Russian spokesman) (“The
US president has spoken directly about the possibility of strikes by the US
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important to assess that resolution. To begin with, the Council
has defined ISIL as an autonomous non-State actor by
dissociating its actions from both Iraq and Syria in Resolution
2199 (2015):
Reaffirming the independence, sovereignty, unity and
territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq and the Syrian
Arab Republic, and reaffirming further the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, . . .
Noting with concern the continued threat posed to
international peace and security by ISIL, ANF and all
other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities
associated with Al-Qaida, and reaffirming its resolve to
address all aspects of that threat.58
In Resolution 2249, and after condemning ISIL’s attacks in
Paris, Beirut, Turkey, and the Sinai, the Council notes that this
group “has the capability and intention to carry out further
attacks and regards all such acts of terrorism as a threat to
peace and security.”59
[The Council] [c]alls upon Member States that have the
capacity to do so to take all necessary measures, in
compliance with international law, in particular with the
United Nations Charter, as well as international human
rights, refugee and humanitarian law, on the territory
under the control of ISIL also known as Da’esh, in Syria
and Iraq, to redouble and coordinate their efforts to
prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed
specifically by ISIL also known as Da’esh as well as ANF,
and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and
entities associated with Al Qaeda, and other terrorist
groups, as designated by the United Nations Security
Council, and as may further be agreed by the
International Syria Support Group (ISSG) and endorsed
by the UN Security Council, pursuant to the statement
of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) of 14
armed forces against Isil positions in Syria without the consent of the legitimate
government[.] . . . This step, in the absence of a UN security council decision,
would be an act of aggression, a gross violation of international law.”).
58. S.C. Res. 2199, pmbl. ¶¶ 7, 22 (Feb. 12, 2015).
59. S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 13, ¶ 1.
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November, and to eradicate the safe haven they have
established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria . . . .60

Early assessments of the resolution pointed at its
ambiguity, in particular its use of Chapter VII language without
explicitly invoking its powers and calling upon States to take
necessary measures without actually mandating or deciding the
adoption of any measure.61 According to Akande and Milanovic,
the resolution does “not provide for the use of force against ISIS
either in Syria or in Iraq;”62 a conclusion shared by Weller.63
Deeks is of the view that Resolution 2249 is mainly an exercise
of soft power by the Council and blurs the “long-standing bright
line between Chapter VII resolutions that authorize force and
those that do not.”64 However, although critical of the Council,
Starski argues that the resolution legitimizes self-defense
without Syrian consent.65 Commenting on Resolution 2249, Sir
Michael Wood, a member of the UN International Law
Commission, disagrees with the argument of ambiguity and
expresses:
[I]t is difficult to read the resolution otherwise than as
an endorsement, in the circumstances, of the use of force
in self-defence against an ongoing or imminent armed
attack by Da’esh, a non-State actor. Paragraph 5 of the
resolution itself referred to the need “to prevent and
suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL
also known as Da’esh as well as [by other specified
terrorist groups]”. No one at the Council meeting at
which the resolution was adopted suggested otherwise.66

60. Id. ¶ 5.
61. Dapo Akande & Marko Milanovic, The Constructive Ambiguity of the
Security Council’s ISIS Resolution, EJIL: TALK!: BLOG OF THE EUR. J. INT’L L.
(Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-constructive-ambiguity-of-thesecurity-councils-isis-resolution/.
62. Id.
63. See Weller, supra note 12.
64. Ashley Deeks, Threading the Needle in Security Council Resolution
2249, LAWFARE (Nov. 23, 2015, 3:25 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
threading-needle-security-council-resolution-2249.
65. See Paulina Starski, “Legitimized Self-Defense” – Quo Vadis Security
Council?, EJIL: TALK!: BLOG OF THE EUR. J. INT’L L. (Dec. 10, 2015),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/legitimized-self-defense-quo-vadis-securitycouncil/#more-13897.
66. Michael Wood, The Use of Force in 2015 With Particular Reference to
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The resolution is not a Chapter VII resolution, which means
neither that it is not binding nor that it lacks important legal
effects.67 The resolution does not authorize UN Members to carry
out any particular actions against ISIL, but it does, among other
things, endorse military actions against this terrorist group. The
scope of the exhortation is vast and long term: (i) to prevent
terrorist acts by ISIL and present and even future associate
entities; (ii) to suppress their terrorist acts; and (iii) to eradicate
the safe haven that ISIL has established in Iraq and Syria. The
resolution has also a territorial limitation: the measures the
Council calls upon States to take must be carried out in the
territory controlled by ISIL and no further. Thus, Syrian
territory controlled by the Syrian army cannot be targeted on the
basis of the resolution, meaning that the exception to the
principle of territorial integrity is also geographically
constrained: a constraint that must be respected, for the
resolution recalls such principle in its preamble.68
As to the reasons for the wording of paragraph 5, a UK
House of Commons’ document expresses:
This careful wording implicitly supports states’ existing
military actions against specific terrorist groups in those
countries without either explicitly accepting or rejecting
the various competing justifications or clearly providing
a new stand-alone legal basis or authorisation for those
actions.
The result is that states are likely to continue relying on
the other varying legal arguments they have been using
up until now, despite the disagreement between Russia
and other states.69
This could be a reason why Resolution 2249 was not adopted
under Chapter VII.70
Equally important is that the resolution does not impose
any explicit restriction on States to claim the right to selfSyria 8 (Hebrew U. Jerusalem, Res. Paper No. 16-05, 2016).
67. See Weller, supra note 12; Akande & Milanovic, supra note 61.
68. See S.C. Res. 2249 (2015), supra note 13, pmbl. ¶ 2.
69. Arabella Lang, Legal Basis for UK Military Action in Syria, HOUSE OF
COMMONS BRIEFING PAPERS NO. 7404 (Dec. 1, 2015), http://research
briefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7404/CBP-7404.pdf.
70. Personal conversation with a public official from a non-permanent
Security Council member who took part in the negotiations.
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defense, so States still can invoke the right against ISIL.71 In
fact, the resolution has important implications for the right to
self-defense against this group. First, States no longer need
Syria and/or Iraq’s consent to lawfully take self-defensive
actions against ISIL.72 The existence of an attack and even of a
threat suffices for the use of use of force in self-defense. Second,
it is important to highlight that the resolution creates an
exception to the obligation to respect the territorial integrity of
Syria only,73 but not to other requirements of the right of selfdefense, such as necessity and proportionality. The latter two
must be complied with by any UN Member acting in self-defense
upon the resolution as part of its express order that all necessary
measures must comply with the Charter and international law.74
Additionally, the call made by the Council is wider and
encompasses not only States that have been the object of
terrorist attacks or terrorist threats by ISIL, but also any State
that has the capabilities to contribute to the eradication of the
group’s safe haven in Syria and Iraq. The resolution then goes
well beyond the confines of self-defense as to ISIL.75
Moreover, it is important to identify what Resolution 2249
does not provide for. It does not establish the right to self-defense
against any autonomous non-State actors in any part of the
world. Consequently, it does not endorse the use of self-defensive
force on the basis only of the existence of terrorist threats or
attack by any autonomous terrorist organizations. The
resolution is circumscribed to ISIL, has a geographic limitation,
and there is no similar endorsement to dispense with the
71. See Nolte & Randelzhofer, supra note 14, at 1428.
72. Consequently, Assad’s statement calling the United Kingdom’s
operation against ISIL in Syria after Resolution 2249 “illegal” lacks merit. As
to the declaration, see Assad says Britain’s Syria Strikes ‘Illegal’, Will
Encourage Terror, MSN NEWS (June 12, 2015), http://www.msn.com/ennz/news/world/assad-says-britains-syria-strikes-illegal-will-encourageterror/ar-AAg50o6?li=AA59FU&ocid=mailsignout.
73. Germany was of this view in its communication to the Security Council
invoking Article 51 and Resolution 2249 as bases for its actions against ISIL in
Syria. See U.N. Security Council, Letter dated Dec. 10, 2015 from the Chargé
d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/946 (Dec.
10, 2015). The United Kingdom made a similar argument. See U.N. Security
Council, Letter dated Dec. 3, 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/928 (Dec.
3, 2015).
74. See S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 13, ¶ 5.
75. Id.
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obligation to respect the territorial integrity of innocent States,
if the given non-State actors’ action cannot be attributed to a
State under the rules of attribution that the Security Council
has established in the domain of terrorism, as will be seen below
in Section IX.
If Resolution 2249 does not create a right of self-defense
against autonomous non-State actors in general, the question
becomes whether or not such a right already existed as a result
of the Security Council’s decisions prior to Resolution 2249. The
answer is negative; there was no explicit decision by the Council
in relation to Article 51 and autonomous non-State actors other
than the 9/11 resolutions from 2002 and before Resolution 2249.
Eighty-four decisions were made by the Council during this time,
all aimed at designing a multilateral framework to deal with
terrorist threats to international peace and security, which were
unrelated to the use of force. These Security Council decisions
are important for the interpretation of the scope of Resolutions
1368 and 1373 (2001) and, ultimately, of Resolution 2249.
IV.

THE SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS AND
PRACTICES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
RELATED TO THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY CAUSED BY NONSTATE ACTORS FROM 2002 TO NOVEMBER
2015 BEFORE RESOLUTION 2249: NO EXPLICIT
EXPANSION OF ARTICLE 51

The purposes of this section are twofold: first, to show that
the Council made a consistent choice to rely on a multilateral
effort to address the threat to international peace and security
caused by terrorist acts; and second, to describe and illustrate
with certain detail the scope and elements of the multilateral
tools. Such detailed description is necessary for interpreters to
answer fundamental questions, such as the potential existence
of implicit subsequent practices able to expand Article 51 to
cover autonomous non-State actors.76
76. What follows in this section and, particularly its footnotes, is tiresome,
but indispensable. An important part of this Article rests on the descriptions
contained herein, which constitute the necessary background—based on what
the International Court stated in Kosovo—of any assessment of whether
subsequent decisions have explicitly expanded Article 51 to cover autonomous
non-State actors. However, those who are familiar with the different
dimensions of the 85 decisions made by the Council over the said period can
skip this Section and move on to Section V.

366

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2

As will be seen in this section, the choice of multilateral
instruments to face terrorist threats has been clear from 2002 to
2015.77 The elements of these tools are several. Some of them are
the following: (i) Council’s mandate to members to adopt or apply
existing domestic legislation to carry out the measures ordered
by the Council; (ii) the creation and/or strengthening of several
sanctions committees made up of the members of the Council
and the expansion and refinement of their working procedures;
(iii) close monitoring by the committee of compliance by UN
members with the given resolutions; (iv) coordination between
the Security Council sanctions committees and between them
and other UN organs; (v) coordination between the committees
and other international, regional, and sub-regional
organizations; and (v) cooperation between UN members in their
counter-terrorism efforts.78
In addition to this type of decision, the Council and its
members made other decisions included in resolutions,
presidential statements, and statements to the press
condemning terrorist attacks in several countries. In all of them,
the need to comply with Resolution 1373 and to cooperate with
the affected countries to bring to justice the perpetrators was
recalled.79
77. This choice has not been the only one made by the Council regarding
threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts. It was
already said that Resolution 2249 endorsed self-defensive actions against ISIL
without Syrian consent. Furthermore, as will be explained in Section IX, from
1998 to 2015 the Council has created and reaffirmed a new standard of
attribution to States of acts carried out by non-State actors in this domain.
78. Section IV is descriptive in character. No comment is included on the
faults or merits of the Security Council’s decisions presented below, as this
section’s purpose is to answer the question of whether subsequent decisions by
the Council on threats to international peace and security have expanded
Article 51 to cover armed attacks by autonomous non-State actors. On the
Council’s counter-terrorism decisions from a multilateral angle, see, for
example, Andreas Paulus, Article 29, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1004–09 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); Jane
Boulden, The Security Council and Terrorism, in UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945
608 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008); Andrea Bianchi, Assessing the
Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s Anti-Terrorism Measures: The Quest
for Legitimacy and Cohesion, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 881 (2006). For a critical
perspective, see Andrew Hudson, Not a Great Asset: The UN Security Council
Counter-Terrorism Regime: Violating Human Rights, 25 BERKELEY. J. INT’L L.
203 (2007).
79. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1530, ¶ 3 (Mar. 11, 2004); S.C. Res. 1611, ¶ 3 (July
7, 2005); see also U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/18 (Apr. 25, 2006); U.N. President
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A. THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S DECISIONS AND PRACTICES ON
TERRORISM FROM 2002 TO NOVEMBER 2015
1. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2002
In 2002, the Security Council adopted five resolutions
related to terrorist threats. Resolutions 139080 and 145281 dealt
with an existing multilateral instrument—namely, the
Resolution 1267 Committee—and were adopted under Chapter
VII.82 The remaining three resolutions—1438, 1440 , and 1450—
contained political statements condemning terrorist attacks in
Bali, Russia, and Kenya.83 In addition to the presidential
statement on the first anniversary of 9/11 mentioned above,84
the Council issued three presidential statements in 2002 related
to the operation of one of the multilateral instruments, the
CTC.85 Finally, there was one press statement issued by the

of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
S/PSRT/2008/19 (June 2, 2008).
80. Resolution 1390 held that the Taliban regime had violated prior
resolutions and condemned that group for allowing Afghanistan to be a base for
Al Qaida. The Council decided to continue measures aimed at freezing Taliban
property and funds, established by Resolution 1267. In effect, Resolution 1267
created a Committee (the Resolution 1267 Committee), consisting of all
members of the Council, and given the task of ensuring UN Members’
compliance with the resolution through the implementation of the following
measures: freeze of the Taliban’s assets and a denial of takeoff or landing to
aircrafts owned, leased, or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban. The
resolution also called upon States to bring proceedings against individuals or
entities that violated the measures and to report to the Committee on
implementation. See S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). Resolution 1390 also
established new measures against the Taliban and Al Qaida, created new tasks
and duties to report for the Resolution 1267 Committee, and requested UN
Members to report it on the implementation of the measures. See S.C. Res. 1390
(Jan. 16, 2002).
81. Resolution 1452 provided for some exceptions to the freezing obligations
of funds belonging to the Taliban pursuant to Resolutions 1267 and 1390. See
S.C. Res. 1452 (Dec. 20, 2002).
82. See S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 80, pmbl. ¶ 10; id., pmbl. ¶ 4.
83. See S.C. Res. 1438 (Oct. 14, 2002); S.C. Res. 1440 (Oct. 24, 2002); S.C.
Res. 1450 (Dec. 12, 2002).
84. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
85. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2002/10 (Apr. 15, 2002); U.N. President of
the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/PRST/2002/26 (Oct. 8 2002); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2002/38 (Dec. 17, 2002).
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members of the Council in 2002 that specifically related to
terrorism, in which an attack in Afghanistan was reproved.86
2. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2003
The Security Council adopted four resolutions relating to
terrorism in 2003. Resolution 1455, a Chapter VII decision,87
and Resolution 1456,88 were multilateral instruments designed
to face the threat posed by terrorism and to deal with the
Resolution 1267 Committee and the CTC. The two other
decisions, Resolutions 1465 and 1516, censured terrorist actions
in Colombia and Turkey.89 The Council also made three
presidential statements in 2003, two of which referred to the
operation of the CTC,90 and one which condemned a terrorist
attack in Iraq.91 There was also in 2003 a single press statement
issued by the members of the Council related to the operation of
a multilateral instrument, the Resolution 1267 Committee.92
86. See Press Release, Security Council, Press Statement on Afghanistan
by Security Council President, U.N. Press Release SC/7497 (Sep. 6, 2002).
87. Resolution 1455 established better coordination between the Resolution
1267 Committee and the CTC. Resolution 1455 also called upon members to
prevent violations of the Council’s resolutions against terrorist groups and to
inform the Resolution 1267 Committee of all investigations and enforcement
actions. This resolution also created a Monitoring Group charged with the tasks
of monitoring implementation by members of the measures ordered by the
Council and of identifying incomplete implementation. See S.C. Res. 1455 (Jan.
17, 2003).
88. Resolution 1456 was portrayed by the Council as a high-level meeting
of the Security Council on combating terrorism, and it was a decision containing
a political declaration that summarized the main elements of the anti-terrorism
strategy put in place by the Council up to that point. The Council explicitly
acknowledged that strong multilateral cooperation was the key to dealing with
terrorism. The Council then called upon States to prevent and suppress active
and passive support for terrorism; to cooperate fully in the investigation,
prosecution, and punishment of acts of terrorism; to bring to justice those who
financed, planned, supported, or committed terrorist actions; and to report to
the CTC fully and promptly. This resolution also requested that the CTC
intensify the efforts to achieve the implementation by UN members of
Resolution 1373. See S.C. Res. 1456 (Jan. 20, 2003).
89. See S.C. Res. 1465 (Feb. 13, 2003); S.C. Res. 1516 (Nov. 20, 2003).
90. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2003/3 (Apr. 4, 2003); U.N. President of the
S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/PRST/2003/17 (Oct. 16, 2003).
91. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PSRT/2003/13 (Aug. 20, 2003).
92. See Press Release, Security Council, Press Statement by Security
Council President Following Briefing by Chair of Committee Monitoring
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3. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2004
The Council handed down four resolutions in 2004 dealing
with threats to peace and security caused by terrorism. Three
were in exercise of the Council’s Chapter VII powers and
enhanced multilateral tools, the Resolution 1267 Committee and
the CTC, to respond to this threat. They were Resolutions
1526,93 1535,94 and 1566.95 The fourth, Resolution 1530,
reproved a terrorist attack in Spain.96 In addition, there were
two presidential statements made by the Council in 2004, both
in response to terrorist attacks in Russia,97 and one press
statement by the members condemning terrorist attacks in
Pakistan, Egypt, and Iraq.98
4. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2005
The Council adopted five resolutions related to terrorism in
2005. The Council continued to strengthen multilateral

Taliban, Al-Qaida Sanctions, U.N. Press Release SC/7730 (Apr. 15, 2003).
93. Resolution 1526 strengthened measures to be taken by UN members
against Al Qaida and the Taliban, their members, and other associated groups
referred to in Resolutions 1267 and 1333. The resolution also established an
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team under the direction of the
Resolution 1267 Committee and instructed the team to submit reports on
States’ implementation of the measures adopted by the Council against Al
Qaida and the Taliban. The resolution also invited States to report to the
Committee any investigation and enforcement actions carried out by them. See
S.C. Res 1526 (Jan. 30, 2004); see also S.C. Res. 1333 (Sept. 19, 2000).
94. Resolution 1535 reinforced the structure of the CTC by creating a
Plenary, made up of all Security Council members, and the Bureau, composed
of the Chair and Vice-Chairs, both assisted by the Counter-Terrorism Executive
Directorate. The purpose of the new structure was to improve the Committee’s
ability to implement Resolution 1373. See S.C. Res. 1535 (Mar. 24, 2004).
95. Resolution 1566 called upon members to cooperate with those States
affected by terrorist acts by finding, denying safe haven to, and bringing to
justice those who supported, facilitated, or participated in such acts. The
resolution called upon international organizations to cooperate with the CTC
and requested that the latter develop a set of best practices to help States
implement Resolution 1373. See S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 38.
96. See S.C. Res. 1530, supra note 79.
97. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2004/31 (Sept. 1, 2004); see also U.N.
President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/PRST/2004/14 (May 10, 2004).
98. See Press Release, Security Council, Press Statement by Security
Council President on Recent Terrorist Attacks, U.N. Press Release SC/8215
(Oct. 8, 2004).
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instruments to deal with it in Resolution 1617, a Chapter VII
decision,99 and in Resolution 1624.100 For its part, Resolution
1625 contained a declaration on strengthening the Council’s
conflict prevention role in Africa in particular and reaffirmed the
principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in
contravention with the Charter. 101 The right to self-defense was
not mentioned. In addition, Resolutions 1611102 and 1618103
denounced the terrorist attacks in London and Iraq,
respectively. Also, the Council rendered two presidential
statements dealing with the ongoing operation of the CTC.104
Moreover, six presidential statements were issued in 2005 in the
aftermath of terrorist operations in Iraq, Egypt, Indonesia,
India, and Jordan.105 Finally, there was one statement to the

99. Resolution 1617 reaffirmed the measures that members had to take
against the individuals included in the list created by Resolutions 1267 and
1333. The Council also defined when there was an association between AlQaeda and the Taliban and other groups, and decided that such associated
groups could also be included in the above-mentioned list. The resolution also
requested that States include the measures imposed on those individuals and
entities on the list and that they inform the Committee of the listing and
delisting procedures. The resolution also mandated coordination between the
Resolution 1267 Committee, the CTC, and another Committee created by
Resolution 1540. See S.C. Res. 1617 (July 29, 2005). Resolution 1540 established
a Security Council committee tasked with implementing the said resolution,
which seeks to prevent non-State actors from developing, acquiring,
manufacturing, possessing, transporting, or using chemical or biological
weapons. See S.C. Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
100. Resolution 1624 dealt with incitement to terrorism through the use of
communications. It recalled members’ obligation to deny safe haven and to
bring to justice those individuals who, among others, support and participate in
the various stages of terrorist attacks. Resolution 1624 required States to enact
legislation aimed at prohibiting incitement to carry out terrorist attacks, at
preventing such incitement, and at denying protection to those guilty of such
conduct. The resolution also obliged States to report to the CTC all the steps
they had taken in this direction. See S.C. Res. 1624 (Sept. 14, 2005).
101. Resolution 1625 recognized the need for partnerships with African
organizations to offer early responses to disputes. S.C. Res. 1625 (Sept. 14,
2005).
102. S.C. Res. 1611 (July 7, 2005).
103. S.C. Res. 1618 (Aug. 4, 2005).
104. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/64 (Dec. 21, 2005); see also U.N.
President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/PRST/2005/3 (Jan. 18, 2005).
105. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/55 (Nov. 10, 2005); see also U.N.
President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/PRST/2005/53 (Oct. 31, 2005); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/45 (Oct. 4, 2005);
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press issued by the members of the Council dealing with
terrorism in 2005, condemning the July 7 attack in London.106
5. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2006
In 2006 the Security Council adopted only one resolution, a
Chapter VII decision, related to terrorism: Resolution 1735.
Deep improvements to multilateral instruments to face
terrorism were put in place by this resolution.107 Furthermore,
there were two presidential statements in 2006, following
terrorist attacks in Egypt and India, respectively.108 Finally,
there was no reference to practice related to terrorism in press
statements in 2006.109
6. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2007
Only one resolution dealing with threats to international
peace provoked by terrorism was adopted by the Council in 2007:
Resolution 1787. It reminded States of the need to comply with
international law when combating terrorism, and commended
States for cooperating with the CTC.110 In addition, the Council
issued eight other presidential statements in 2007 in response
to terrorism attacks,111 and highlighted in another its
U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/37 (July 27, 2005); U.N. President of the S.C.,
Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/36
(July 27, 2005); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/29 (July 8, 2005).
106. Press Release, Security Council, Press Statement on London Terrorist
Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/8439 (July 7, 2005).
107. Resolution 1735 confirmed the set of measures established by prior
resolutions and improved the listing and delisting process in terms of the
quality and nature of the information that must be provided by designating
members and the information that could be made public to interested States.
Resolution 1735 directed the Resolution 1267 Committee to identify causes of
non-compliance and to report to the Council on this matter. See S.C. Res. 1735
(Dec. 22, 2006).
108. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/30 (July 12, 2006); see also U.N.
President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/PRST/2006/18 (Apr. 25, 2006).
109. See Press Statements, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/en/sc/
documents/press/2006.shtml (listing press statements made by the President of
the Security Council in 2006) (last visited Feb. 21, 2017).
110. S.C. Res. 1787 (Dec. 10, 2007).
111. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
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willingness to work together with the UN Secretary General to
address “the multifaceted and interconnected challenges and
threats confronting our world.”112 Lastly, the members of the
Council issued three press statements in 2007 as a result of
terrorist attacks in India, Iraq, and Afghanistan.113
7. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2008
In 2008 the Council issued two resolutions in order to
improve multilateral instruments—the Resolution 1267
Committee and the CTC—to face terrorist threats: Resolution
1805114 and Resolution 1922, a Chapter VII decision.115 In

Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/50 (Dec. 27, 2007); see also U.N.
President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/PRST/2007/45 (Dec. 11, 2007); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/39 (Oct. 22, 2007);
U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/36 (Oct. 5, 2007); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement
by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/32 (Sept. 7,
2007); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/26 (July 9, 2007); U.N. President of the S.C.,
Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/11
(Apr. 13, 2007); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/ 2007/10 (Apr. 12, 2007).
112. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/1 (Jan. 8, 2008).
113. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns Attack
on Military Bus in Kabul, U.N. Press Release SC/9162 (Nov. 5, 2007); see also
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Baghdad
Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/8974 (Mar. 22, 2007); Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Press Statement on Bombing of Delhi-Lahore Train,
U.N. Press Release SC/8961 (Feb. 20, 2007).
114. Resolution 1805 urged the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive
Directorate (“CTED”) to increase members’ counter-terrorism capabilities, and
stressed the need for a close dialogue between members, the CTC, and the
CTED. See S.C. Res. 1805 (Mar. 20, 2008).
115. In response to challenges before national courts to measures taken on
the basis of counter-terrorism resolutions, Resolution 1822 recognized the need
for a fair and clear process for the inclusion of individuals and entities within
the consolidated list pursuant to Resolutions 1267 and 1333 (the “Consolidated
List”). The resolution improved the listing and delisting procedures by
increasing transparency. It directed the Resolution 1267 Committee to make
accessible on its website a summary of the reasons for listing individuals or
entities. Also, the resolution demanded that notified States take all possible
measures to inform the listed individual or entity of the designation, its reasons,
effects, and the Committee’s procedures for assessing delisting requests. The
resolution also welcomed the creation of a Focal Point that allowed listed
individuals and entities to directly request delisting. See S.C. Res. 1822 (June
30, 2008).
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addition, the Council made four presidential statements
condemning terrorist attacks in Pakistan and Algeria.116 Lastly,
the members of the Council issued eight press statements
censuring terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey,
Spain, Syria, and India.117
8. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2009
The Security Council enacted only one resolution in 2009,
Resolution 1904, a Chapter VII decision aimed again at
improving a multilateral tool, the Resolution 1267 Committee.118
The Council made only one presidential statement in 2009, in
the aftermath of a terrorist attack in Indonesia.119 Lastly, the
116. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2008/35 (Sept. 22, 2008); see also U.N.
President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/PRST/2008/32 (Aug. 21, 2008); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2008/31 (Aug. 19,
2008); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2008/19 (June 2, 2008).
117. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement
on Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, U.N. Press Release SC/9513 (Nov. 28, 2008);
see also Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on
Damascus Terrorist Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/9460 (Sept. 27, 2008); Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist
Attacks in Spain, U.N. Press Release SC/9455 (Sept. 24, 2008); Press Release,
Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in
Turkey, U.N. Press Release SC/9394 (July 10, 2008); Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan,
U.N. Press Release SC/9389 (July 8, 2008); Press Release, Security Council,
Security Council Press Statement on Kabul Bomb Attack, U.N. Press Release
SC/9386 (July 7, 2008); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press
Statement on Kandahar Terrorist Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/9251 (Feb. 17,
2008); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on
Kabul Hotel Bombing, U.N. Press Release SC/9226 (Jan. 15, 2008).
118. Resolution 1904 reaffirmed the traditional measures and their
exemptions for humanitarian reasons. The most important development the
resolution contained was the creation of an independent Office of the
Ombudsperson, which would assist the Resolution 1267 Committee in dealing
with delisting requests made by individuals. The resolution also dealt with the
review and maintenance of the Consolidated List by encouraging members to
provide the Committee with additional information on listed persons and
entities related to operating status, incarceration, movement, and death, among
others. The resolution also requested the Monitoring Team to identify the listed
individuals and entities whose information was not enough to ensure
implementation of the measures imposed upon them. See S.C. Res. 1904 (Dec.
17, 2009).
119. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2009/22 (July 17, 2009).
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members of the Council issued five press statements after
terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran.120
9. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2010
Resolution 1963 was the only resolution adopted by the
Council on threats to international peace provoked by terrorism
in 2010 and, again, was aimed at developing a multilateral tool,
the CTC, to cope with this threat.121 As to presidential
statements, the Council issued two. The statement of February
24 dealt with the connection between drug trafficking and
terrorism and called for international and regional cooperation
and for States to prosecute persons responsible for organized
crime, terrorism, and corruption.122 The second statement, on
September 27, mainly addressed issues of compliance with
previous resolutions, cooperation between UN members, and
with the operation of the CTC.123 Finally, the members of the
Security Council issued seven statements related to terrorism in
response to terrorist attacks in Russia, Uganda, Iran, Nigeria,
Afghanistan, and Iraq.124
120. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement
on Terrorist Attack in Iran, U.N. Press Release SC/9770 (Oct. 20, 2009); see also
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on the Kabul
Bomb Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/9763 (Oct. 8, 2009); Press Release,
Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in
Kandahar, U.N. Press Release SC/9735 (Aug. 26, 2009); Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Press Statement on Baghdad Bombings, U.N. Press
Release SC/9733 (Aug. 19, 2009); Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Kabul, U.N. Press Release
SC/9593 (Feb. 11, 2009).
121. Resolution 1963 contained some decisions regarding the operation of
the CTC and the CTED in terms of the developing of States’ capabilities to
combat terrorism. The resolution also reminded members that counterterrorism measures and respect for human rights were complementary and
reinforced each other. See S.C. Res. 1963 (Dec. 20, 2010).
122. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2010/4 (Feb. 24, 2010).
123. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2010/19 (Sept. 27, 2010).
124. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement
on Violence in Iraq, U.N. Press Release SC/10081 (Nov. 10, 2010); see also Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist
Attack in Herat, U.N. Press Release SC/10070 (Oct. 25, 2010); Press Release,
Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Abuja Bombings, U.N.
Press Release SC/10048 (Oct. 4, 2010); Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Press Statement on Deadly Vladikavkz Bombing, U.N. Press Release
SC/10025 (Sept. 13, 2010); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council
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10. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2011
The Security Council enacted two resolutions in 2011
regarding terrorism: Resolutions 1988125 and 1989, 126 both
Chapter VII decisions creating and improving multilateral
instruments to overcome terrorist threats. The Council issued
two presidential statements in this domain. The first
presidential statement was issued on February 11 and
addressed the interdependence between security and

Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Iran, U.N. Press Release SC/9986 (July
16, 2010); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement
on Kampala Bombings, U.N. Press Release SC/9980 (July 12, 2010); Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Deadly Moscow
Bombings, U.N. Press Release SC/9895 (Mar. 29, 2010).
125. Resolution 1988 reaffirmed the measures against the Taliban and
created a separate sanction regime for the group, whose members or associates
were to be included within a particular list and no longer the Consolidated List
created by Resolutions 1267 and 1333. The resolution also created a new
Sanctions Committee, consisting of all the members of the Council, and decided
that the acts or activities that could make a person or entity eligible for
designation were the participation in the various stages of terrorist acts, such
as the supply of arms and related material, and recruitment. The resolution
also decided that all members had to apply the available exemptions set forth
in Resolutions 1452 and 1735 to the measures already mentioned. Resolution
1988 directed its Committee to make accessible on its website a narrative
summary of the reasons for the listing. As to delisting procedures, Resolution
1988 ordered the Committee to remove names of those individuals who had
renounced terrorism and any membership in terrorist entities, and it also made
it possible for individuals and entities to request delisting without members’
support by submitting such request to the Focal Point created by Resolution
173. See S.C. Res. 1988, ¶ 1 (June 17, 2011).
126. Resolution 1989 adjusted the Resolution 1267 Committee’s mandate to
the changes introduced by Resolution 1988 and to the Committee established
therein, while preserving the measures against Al-Qaida and its members, the
requirements of listing requests by UN States, and the procedure to follow after
listing names. The resolution also determined that the Ombudsperson had to
present to the Committee recommendations regarding the delisting request the
office had received and determined the procedure to be followed. It also stated
that, when the designating State requested a delisting, members would
terminate the measures against the given person or entity 60 days after the
request, unless the Committee decided by consensus to keep the listing. In the
absence of consensus, the Security Council would make the decision within 60
days. The resolution reaffirmed the existing notification procedure of
nationality, location, or incorporation of any delisting to UN members and to
the individuals and entities themselves. In terms of the review and
maintenance of the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, Resolution 1989 requested periodic
updates. As to measure-implementation procedures, Resolution 1989 urged
States to implement the standards embodied in the Financial Action Task Force
(“FATF”) Recommendations and the FATF Special Recommendations on
Terrorist Financing. See S.C. Res. 1989 (June 17, 2011).
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development.127 The second presidential statement was issued
on the day of the death of Osama Bin Laden, May 2, 2011. The
Council stated:
The Security Council stresses that no cause or grievance
can justify the murder of innocent people and that
terrorism will not be defeated by military force, law
enforcement measures, and intelligence operations
alone, and can only be defeated by a sustained and
comprehensive
approach
involving
the
active
participation and collaboration of all States and relevant
international and regional organizations and civil society
to address the conditions conducive to the spread of
terrorism and to impede, impair, isolate and incapacitate
the terrorist threat.128
The death of Bin Laden gave the Council the opportunity to refer
in some way to the right to self-defense once again. It is telling
that, instead, the Council emphasized only the multilateral
character of the fight against terrorism.
Also worth noting is the fact that the tenth anniversary of
the 9/11 attacks came and went without the Council’s
mentioning the right to self-defense. The press statement issued
by the Council on September 11, 2011, made no reference to this
right as an important means to face threats to international
peace and security posed by terrorism. Instead, the members
gave significant emphasis to the multinational dimension of the
effort by stating:
The members of the Security Council noted that in the
period after the 11 September 2001 attacks, States
joined together in a spirit of cooperation to combat
terrorism, including through diplomatic efforts at and
with the United Nations, and that such cooperation is
essential and should be further strengthened.129

127. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2011/4 (Feb. 11, 2011).
128. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2011/9, ¶ 9 (May 2, 2011).
129. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on
Tenth Anniversary of 11 September 2001, U.N. Press Release SC/10378, ¶ 4
(Sept. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Press Statement on Tenth Anniversary of 11
September 2001].

2017]

FROM AL-QAIDA IN 2001 TO ISIL IN 2015

377

Finally, the members of the Council issued nine other
statements related to terrorism during 2011, condemning
terrorist attacks in Russia, Belarus, Norway, India, Syria, and
Nigeria.130
11. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2012
Two resolutions on threats to international peace prompted
by terrorism were made by the Council in 2012: Resolution
2082131 and Resolution 2083.132 Both were Chapter VII decisions
130. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement
on Terrorist Attacks in Nigeria, U.N. Press Release SC/10507 (Dec. 27, 2011);
see also Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on
Terrorist Attack in Damascus, Syria, U.N. Press Release SC/10506 (Dec. 23,
2011); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on
Terrorist Attack in India, U.N. Press Release SC/10377 (Sept. 7, 2011); Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Abuja Bombing,
U.N. Press Release SC/10370 (Aug. 26, 2011); Press Release, Security Council,
Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Norway, U.N. Press
Release SC/10337 (July 25, 2011); Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Press Statement on Attacks in Mumbai, India, U.N. Press Release
SC/10325 (July 13, 2011); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council
Press Statement on Minsk Bombing, U.N. Press Release SC/10225 (Apr. 13,
2011); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on
Deadly Moscow Bombing, U.N. Press Release SC/10162 (Jan. 24, 2011).
131. Resolution 2082 defined the assets that could be frozen, and reiterated
when an entity was associated with the Taliban and could, therefore, be listed
by the Resolution 1988 Committee. The resolution also exempted from the
travel ban, under certain conditions, those listed individuals participating in
the Afghan reconciliation process. As to listing procedures, Resolution 2082
improved them by urging members to consult with the Afghan government
before making listing requests to the Committee. As to delisting procedures,
Resolution 2082 followed Resolution 1988 in general terms and mandated
expeditious removal of individuals and entities that no longer met the criteria
or had renounced terrorism. See S.C. Res. 2082 (Dec. 17, 2012).
132. Resolution 2083 reaffirmed the existing measures against Al Qaida, its
members, and associated entities and the information requirements regarding
them, the notification procedure for States and listed individuals and entities,
and the information disclosure requirements. As to delisting, the resolution also
reaffirmed the existing procedure and time-frame when it was the designating
State who requested delisting to the Resolutions 1267/1989 Committee. The
resolution also directed the Committee to provide reasons for objections to
delisting requests, confirmed prior notification procedures of delisting decisions,
and introduced adjustments to exemptions procedures. As to the Review and
Maintenance of the Al Qaeda Sanctions List, Resolution 2083 was in line with
prior resolutions, in particular regarding deceased listed individuals. As to
measures implementation, the resolution reaffirmed members’ obligation to
identify or introduce procedures to implement the sanctions against listed
individuals and urged States to implement the Financial Action Task Force’s
recommendations on combating money laundering and the financing of
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and multilateral in character, calling for strengthening the
Resolution 1988 Committee and the CTC. In terms of
presidential statements, the Security Council issued one on May
4, 2012, in which it referenced several dimensions of its strategy
to deal with terrorist threats.133 For their part, the members of
the Security Council issued 12 statements related to terrorism
in 2012. Condemnation was made after terrorist attacks in
Syria, Nigeria, Yemen, Bulgaria, Iraq, Somalia, and Lebanon.134
12. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2013
The Council enacted one resolution in 2013, Resolution
2129, dealing again with different dimensions of the CTC to cope
with terrorist threats.135 The Council issued only one
presidential statement, which was the result of an open debate

terrorism. See S.C. Res. 2083 (Dec. 17, 2012).
133. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2012/17 (May 4, 2012).
134. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement
on Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SC/10799 (Oct. 19, 2012); see also Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist
Attacks in Aleppo, U.N. Press Release SC/10784 (Oct. 5, 2012); Press Release,
Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in
Somalia, U.N. Press Release SC/10774 (Sept. 21, 2012); Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in Yemen, U.N.
Press Release SC/10762 (Sept. 13, 2012); Press Release, Security Council,
Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Iraq, U.N. Press
Release SC/10757 (Sept. 11 2012); Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in Bulgaria, U.N. Press Release
SC/10717 (July 19, 2012); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council
Press Statement on Attacks in Syria, U.N. Press Release SC/10658 (May 27,
2012); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on
Terrorist Attack in Yemen, U.N. Press Release SC/10656 (May 21, 2012); Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist
Attacks in Damascus, U.N. Press Release SC/10643 (May 10, 2012); Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist
Attacks in Syria, U.N. Press Release SC/10585 (Mar. 21, 2012); Press Release,
Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in
Nigeria, U.N. Press Release SC/10530 (Jan. 26, 2012); Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Press Statement on Damascus Terrorist Attack, U.N.
Press Release SC/10513 (Jan. 6, 2012).
135. Resolution 2129 invited the CTED to cooperate with UN members and
regional and sub-regional organizations on the formulation of counterterrorism
strategies to implement Resolutions 1373 and 1624. The Resolution invited the
CTDE to engage in partnerships with civil society and international
organizations, in consultation with given members, in order to prevent the
spread of terrorism, and also stressed the importance of tailored dialogues
among the CTC, the CTDE, and members. See S.C. Res. 2129 (Dec. 17, 2013).
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held on a comprehensive response to counter-terrorism. 136
Lastly, the members of the Council issued 26 press statements
after terrorist attacks in Algeria, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia,
Libya, Turkey, Niger, Lebanon, Kenya, Iraq, Yemen, Mali, and
Russia. In these statements the Council reaffirmed the need to
bring perpetrators to justice and called upon States to cooperate
to this end.137
136. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2013/1, ¶¶ 2, 4, 8 (Jan. 15, 2013).
137. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement
on Second Terrorist Attack in Russian Federation, U.N. Press Release SC/11234
(Dec. 30, 2013); see also Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press
Statement on Terrorist Attack in Russian Federation, U.N. Press Release
SC/11233 (Dec. 29, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council
Press Statement on Lebanon Terrorist Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/11232
(Dec. 27, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press
Statement on Terrorist Attack in Mali, U.N. Press Release SC/11214 (Dec. 14,
2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on
Attack Against Defense Ministry of Yemen, U.N. Press Release SC/11202 (Dec.
5, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on
Attacks in Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/11199 (Dec. 4, 2013); Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Violence in
Iraq, U.N. Press Release SC/11186 (Nov. 25, 2013); Press Release, Security
Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in Lebanon, U.N.
Press Release SC/11180 (Nov. 19, 2013); Press Release, Security Council,
Security Council Press Statement on Bomb Attack in Mogadishu, U.N. Press
Release SC/11170 (Nov. 9, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Press Statement on Attack in Nairobi, U.N. Press Release SC/11129
(Sept. 21, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press
Statement on 13 September Attack Against United States Consulate in
Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/11122 (Sept. 13, 2013); Press Release,
Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in
Tripoli, Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SC/11101 (Aug. 23, 2013); Press Release,
Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Lebanon, U.N. Press
Release SC/11095 (Aug. 15, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Press Statement on 3 August Attack in Afghanistan, U.N. Press
Release SC/11086 (Aug. 5, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security
Council Press Statement on Attack Against Turkish Embassy in Somalia, U.N.
Press Release SC/11080 (July 29, 2013); Press Release, Security Council,
Security Council Press Statement on Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SC/11055
(July 9, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press
Statement on Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/11030 (June 11, 2013); Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Afghanistan,
U.N. Press Release SC/11016 (May 26, 2013); Press Release, Security Council,
Security Council Press Statement on Attacks in Niger, U.N. Press Release
SC/11014 (May 24, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council
Press Statement on Deadly Attack in Benghazi, Libya, U.N. Press Release
SC/11008 (May 13, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council
Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Reyhanli, Turkey, U.N. Press Release
SC/11006 (May 13, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council
Press Statement on Attack Against French Embassy in Libya, U.N. Press
Release SC/10984 (Apr. 23, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security
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13. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2014

In 2014 the Security Council adopted five resolutions
related to terrorism: Resolutions 2133,138 2160,139 2161,140
2170,141 and 2178.142 Resolutions 2160, 2161, 2170, and 2178 are
Chapter VII decisions. All are aimed at improving or expanding
the scope of multilateral tools—the Resolutions 1267/1889
Committee, the CTC, and the Resolution 1988 Committee—to
respond to the emergence of ISIL and the ANF.
Resolution 2170 reiterates that terrorism is one of the most
serious threats to international peace and security and strongly
condemns ISIL’s actions, but does not mention the right to selfdefense.143 The Council’s response to ISIL in Resolution 2178
Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Somalia, U.N. Press Release
SC/10972 (Apr. 15 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council
Press Statement on Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/10967 (Apr. 4, 2013);
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on
Damascus Bombing, U.N. Press Release SC/10953 (Mar. 22, 2013); Press
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist
Attack in Amenas, Algeria, U.N. Press Release SC/10887 (Jan. 18, 2013).
138. Resolution 2133 attempts to prevent kidnapping by terrorist
organizations by seeking to reduce organizations’ access to funding and
financial services. It calls upon States to cooperate during events of kidnapping
by terrorist groups and encourages the Monitoring Team of the Resolutions
1267/1989 Committee and the Resolution 1988 Committee to cooperate when
furnishing information on trends and developments in this domain. See S.C.
Res. 2133 (Jan. 27, 2014).
139. Resolution 2160 deals with the threats that the Taliban and Al-Qaida
pose to Afghanistan. It keeps the fine tuning of the operation of the Resolution
1988 Committee in term of supporting information for the listing of entities and
individuals, de-listing procedures, and compliance with the Resolution, among
other issues. See S.C. Res. 2160 (June 17, 2014).
140. In addition to the traditional provisions on measures against Al-Qaida
and associated entities or individuals and exemptions, Resolution 2161 urges
States to implement the standards contemplated in the Financial Action Task
Force’s Forty Recommendations on Combating Money Laundering and the
Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation. Further, the resolution continues to
refine listing procedures for the Resolutions 1267/1989 Committee in terms of
quality, transparency, inter-state cooperation, timely notification to listed
individuals, de-listing requests and procedures, the duties and responsibilities
of the Ombudsperson and the general structure of delisting procedure, the
maintenance of the list in order to remove these listings if they are no longer
appropriate. Finally, Resolution 2161 also directs the Resolutions 1267/1989
Committee to cooperate with the Resolution 1988 Committee, the CTC, and the
Resolution 1540 Committee. See S.C. Res. 2161 (June 17, 2014).
141. See S.C. Res. 2170 (Aug. 15, 2014).
142. See S.C. Res. 2178 (Sept. 24, 2014).
143. Resolution 2170 explicitly provides for the measures contemplated by
Resolution 2161 (2014) to be applied to ISIL and ANF as well. S.C. Res. 2170, ¶
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remains focused on the multilateral dimension. The Council
reaffirms “its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity
and political independence of all States in accordance with the
Charter”144 and notes the “recent developments and initiatives
at the international, regional and sub-regional levels to prevent
and suppress international terrorism.”145 The focus of the
resolution is the multinational effort to address the issue of
foreign terrorist fighters who pose a risk to their state of origin
and the states to which they travel.146
5, (Aug. 15, 2014). The resolution urges States to cooperate in order to bring to
justice ISIL and ANF members and associated entities or undertakings. Id. It
reaffirms that States must prevent the direct or indirect supply of arms and
related material of all kinds to ISIL and ANF and ensure that no funds are
made available to them by persons or entities within their territories. Id. ¶ 10.
Resolution 2170 also notes that ISIL and ANF have gained control of oilfields,
and the Council reiterates that engaging in trade with the organizations
constitutes financial support for entities designated by the Resolutions
1267/1989 Committee and leads to additional listings. Id. ¶ 13. Finally,
Resolution 2170 expresses that individuals, groups, and entities giving support
to ISIL and ANF can be included on the Al-Qaida sanctions list, and it identifies
a set of individuals that shall be the subject of the measures provided for in
Resolution 2161. Id. ¶ 18. Resolution 2170 also directs the Monitoring Team to
report to the said Committee on the threat, resources, and funding of ISIL and
ANF within 90 days. Id. ¶ 22. Resolution 2170 explicitly provides for the
measures contemplated by Resolution 2161 (2014) to be applied to ISIL and
ANF as well. The resolution urges States to cooperate in order to bring to justice
ISIL and ANF members and associated entities or undertakings. It reaffirms
that States must prevent the direct or indirect supply of arms and related
material of all kinds to ISIL and ANF and ensure that no funds are made
available to them by persons or entities within their territories. Resolution 2170
also notes that ISIL and ANF have gained control of oilfields, and the Council
reiterates that engaging in trade with the organizations constitutes financial
support for entities designated by the Resolutions 1267/1989 Committee and
leads to additional listings. Finally, Resolution 2170 expresses that individuals,
groups, and entities giving support to ISIL and ANF can be included on the AlQaida sanctions list, and it identifies a set of individuals that shall be the
subject of the measures provided for in Resolution 2161. Resolution 2170 also
directs the Monitoring Team to report to the said Committee on the threat,
resources, and funding of ISIL and ANF within 90 days. See S.C. Res. 2170
(Aug. 15, 2014).
144. S.C. Res. 2178, pmbl. ¶ 6 (Aug. 15, 2014).
145. Id. pmbl. ¶ 17.
146. The Council reaffirms in Resolution 2178 that States must prevent the
movement of terrorists by effective border controls and urges States to intensify
the exchange of information regarding actions or movements of foreign terrorist
fighters. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 142, ¶ 2. Resolution 2178 also decides that
States must prevent financial support for these fighters and implement
prosecution and reintegration strategies for those who return to their countries
of origin. Id. ¶ 4. The Resolution also decides that all States must ensure that
their legislation establishes serious criminal offenses sufficient to prosecute and
penalize nationals who travel or attempt to travel to other States for the
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The Council issued four presidential statements related to
terrorism in 2014. In its first statement, on January 10, the
Council condemned the attacks in Iraq carried out by ISIL and
reaffirmed past practice calling on States to cooperate in order
to bring to justice the perpetrators and to comply with
international law when adopting measures aimed at combatting
terrorism. Importantly, the Council calls for unity between
different segments of Iraqi society to face the threat, without
framing the situation within the contours of self-defense.147 The
Council issued the second presidential statement on July 28,
2014, which also dealt with the threats posed by ISIL and ANF.
The statement starts by reaffirming past resolutions, including
Resolution 1373, and underscores that trading in oil with these
organizations is a violation of the Council’s resolutions.148
The third presidential statement took place on September
19, 2014, and in it, the Council condemns what it calls a largescale offensive by ISIL and associated groups against Iraq,
which posed a major threat to the region. The Council also urges
the international community to support Iraq in its fight against
ISIL and stresses that terrorism can be defeated only by a
comprehensive approach involving the active participation of all
parties.149 The fourth presidential statement was made by the
Council on November 19, once again in response to the situation
created by ISIL and ANF in Syria and Iraq.150 It closely follows
the four resolutions adopted in 2014 and urges States to take
prompt action.
The Council also issued 40 terrorism-related press
statements in 2014. The statements were made in response to
terrorist attacks in Lebanon, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
purpose of participating at various stages of terrorist attacks and for the
provision of funds in any way with knowledge that they will be used to finance
the travel of foreign terrorist fighters. Id. ¶ 6. Resolution 2178 also orders States
to deny entry or transit of any individual that might be considered to be doing
so for the purpose of the said criminal offenses. Id. ¶ 8. It also calls upon
members to improve cooperation at all levels to prevent the travel of foreign
terrorist fighters and emphasizes that they could be eligible for inclusion on the
Al-Qaida Sanctions list. Id. ¶ 11.
147. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2014/1 (Jan. 10, 2014).
148. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2014/14 (July 28, 2014).
149. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2014/20 (Sept. 19, 2014).
150. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2014/23 (Nov. 19, 2014).
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Yemen, Nigeria, Algeria, Belgium, Iraq, Libya, Greece, and
Mali.151
151. See generally Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in
Mogadishu, U.N. Press Release SC/11721-AFR/3047-PKO/460 (Dec. 26, 2014);
Press Release, Security Council, Yemen, U.N. Press Release SC/11710 (Dec. 17,
2014); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Peshawar, Pakistan,
U.N. Press Release SC/11707 (Dec. 16, 2014); Press Release, Security Council,
Attack against Israeli Embassy in Athens, U.N. Press Release SC/11700 (Dec.
13, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Kabul Attack, U.N. Press Release
SC/11695-AFG/433 (Dec. 11, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Yemen,
U.N. Press Release SC/11683 (Dec. 4, 2014); Press Release, Security Council,
Terrorist Attack in Mogadishu, U.N. Press Release SC/11710 (Dec. 3, 2014);
Press Release, Security Council, Attack in Kabul, Afghanistan, U.N. Press
Release SC/11678-AFG/432 (Nov. 27, 2014); Press Release, Security Council,
Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/11664-AFG/431 (Nov. 24, 2014); Press
Release, Security Council, ISIL Killings, U.N. Press Release SC/11654 (Nov. 18,
2014); Press Release, Security Council, Bomb Attacks in Tripoli, U.N. Press
Release SC/11646-AFR/3015 (Nov. 13, 2014); Press Release, Security Council,
Suicide Bomb Attack against Government Science Technical School in
Potiskum in Yobe State, Nigeria, U.N. Press Release SC/11639-AFR/3014 (Nov.
10, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Iraq, U.N. Press Release SC/11625IK/694 (Oct. 31, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attacks by
ISIL, U.N. Press Release SC/11605-IK/693 (Oct. 17, 2014); Press Release,
Security Council, Yemen, U.N. Press Release SC/11595 (Oct. 10, 2014); Press
Release, Security Council, Bomb Attacks on School in Homs, Syria, U.N. Press
Release SC/11589 (Oct. 3, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Murder of
Alan Henning, U.N. Press Release SC/11590 (Oct. 3, 2014); Press Release,
Security Council, Murder of Hervé Gourdel, U.N. Press Release SC/11581 (Sept.
24, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Mali, U.N. Press Release SC/11568AFR/2970-PKO/439 (Sept. 19, 2014); Press Release, Security Council,
Afghanistan Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/11431-AFG/417 (June 6, 2014);
Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Belgium, U.N. Press
Release SC/11418 (May 28, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Afghanistan
Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/11411-AFG/416 (May 23, 2014); Press Release,
Security Council, Attacks in Nigeria, U.N. Press Release SC/11387-AFR/2882
(May 9, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Yemen, U.N.
Press Release SC/11381 (May 5, 2014); Press Release, Security Council,
Terrorist Attack in Somalia, U.N. Press Release SC/11380-AFR/2877 (May 4,
2014); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Algeria, U.N. Press
Release SC/11364-AFR/2872 (Apr. 24, 2014); Press Release, Security Council,
Terrorist Attacks in Nigeria, U.N. Press Release SC/11352-AFR/2861 (Apr. 14,
2014); Press Release, Security Council, Attack in Yemen, U.N. Press Release
SC/11336 (Mar. 25, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in
Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/11334-AFG/408 (Mar. 21, 2014); Press
Release, Security Council, Attack on Somalia, U.N. Press Release SC/11331AFR/2840 (Mar. 19, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in
Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/11324-AFG/407 (Mar. 18, 2014); Press
Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Somalia, U.N. Press Release
SC/11300-AFR/2831 (Feb. 27, 2014); Press Statement, Security Council,
Terrorist Attack in Somalia, U.N. Press Release SC/11291-AFR/2823 (Feb. 21,
2014); Press Release, Security Council, Attack in Lebanon, U.N. Press Release
SC/11287 (Feb. 19, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Lebanon, U.N. Press
Release SC/11269 (Feb. 1, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Deadly

384

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2
14. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2015

In 2015, prior to Resolution 2249, the Council adopted two
resolutions under Chapter VII. Resolution 2199 continues with
the design and use of multilateral tools, such as the Resolutions
1267/1989 Committee, to face the threat to international peace
and security caused by ISIL.152 Resolution 2214 also deals with
multilateral tools, the above-mentioned Committee, and is
aimed at combating terrorist actions by Al-Qaida, ISIL, and a
new group, Ansar Al Charia, in Libya.153 The Council also issued
three presidential statements before November 2015. Two
condemn attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram and highlight the
regional efforts to combat this entity,154 while the third deals
again with ISIL and foreign fighters with calls for wide
implementation of Resolution 2178 (2014) by UN members.155
Lastly, the members of the Council made 41 statements to
the press from January to November 2015, all of which condemn
terrorist attacks in France, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Libya,
Egypt, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Somalia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia,
Afghanistan, and Mali, and reaffirm past pronouncements on
international cooperation and justice for perpetrators.156
Terrorist Attack in Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SC/11256 (Jan. 21, 2014);
Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Kabul, U.N. Press Release
SC/11251-AFG/405 (Jan. 17, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SC/11250-L/3224 (Jan. 16, 2014);
Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Lebanon, U.N. Press
Release SC/11249 (Jan. 16, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Attack in
Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SC/11239 (Jan. 2, 2014); Press Release, Security
Council, Mogadishu, U.N. Press Release SC/11240-AFR/2789 (Jan. 2, 2014).
152. Resolution 2199 contains measures on oil trade, cultural heritage,
banking, arms and related material, and asset freeze aimed at striking at ISIL’s
financial resources. See S.C. Res. 2199, supra note 58.
153. In particular, Resolution 2214 encourages UN Member States to
“submit listing requests to the Committee established pursuant to resolutions
1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) . . . of individuals and entities supporting ISIL,
Ansar Al Charia,” and Al-Qaida in Libya. S.C. Res. 2214, ¶ 4 (Mar. 27, 2015).
This resolution has not been included as a decision related to threats to
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, but its connection with
the topic is significant.
154. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2015/4 (Jan. 19, 2015); U.N. President of
the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/PRST/2015/14 (July 28, 2015).
155. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2015/11 (May 29, 2015).
156. See generally Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in
Bamako, U.N. Press Release SC/12133-AFR/3268 (Nov. 20, 2015); Press
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Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attacks in Lebanon, U.N. Press Release
SC/12120 (Nov. 13, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in
Paris, U.N. Press Release SC/12121 (Nov. 13, 2015); Press Release, Security
Council, Terrorist Attacks by Boko Haram, U.N. Press Release SC/12075AFR/3242 (Oct. 12, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Eid Bombings in
Yemen, U.N. Press Release SC/12056 (Sept. 24, 2015); Press Release, Security
Council, Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/12003AFG/442 (Aug. 9, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attacks in
Saudi Arabia, U.N. Press Release SC/12000 (Aug. 6, 2015); Press Release,
Security Council, Attacks in Mogadishu, U.N. Press Release SC/11981AFR/3186 (July 27, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attacks in
Suruç, Turkey, U.N. Press Release SC/11979 (July 22, 2015); Press Release,
Security Council, Terrorist Attacks in Mali, U.N. Press Release SC/11959AFR/3173-PKO/505 (July 2, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Al-Shabaab
Attacks in Somalia, U.N. Press Release SC/11949-AFR/3166-PKO/501 (June 27,
2015); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attacks in France, Kuwait,
Tunisia, U.N. Press Release SC/11947 (June 26, 2015); Press Release, Security
Council, Al-Shabaab Attack in Mogadishu, U.N. Press Release SC/11945AFR/3162 (June 25, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in
Yemen, U.N. Press Release SC/11935 (June 18, 2015); Press Release, Security
Council, Terrorist Attack in N’Djamena, Chad, U.N. Press Release SC/11927AFR/3157 (June 15, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Attacks against
Civilians in Syria, U.N. Press Release SC/11921 (June 5, 2015); Press Release,
Security Council, Al-Shabaab Attack against UNICEF in Garowe, Somalia,
U.N. Press Release SC/11866-AFR/3117 (Apr. 20, 2015); Press Release, Security
Council, Terrorist Attack in Mogadishu, Somalia, U.N. Press Release SC/11863AFR/3113 (Apr. 15, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Attacks in Tripoli,
U.N. Press Release SC/11861-AFR/3112 (Apr. 14, 2015); Press Release Security
Council, Mali, U.N. Press Release SC/11855-AFR/3108 (Apr. 10, 2015); Press
Release, Security Council, Al-Shabaab Attack in Garissa, Kenya, U.N. Press
Release SC/11850-AFR/3104 (Apr. 3, 2015); Press Release, Security Council,
Terrorist Attack in Mogadishu, U.N. Press Release SC/11844-AFR/3099 (Mar.
28, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Bomb Attacks in Yemen, U.N. Press
Release SC/11827 (Mar. 20, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist
Attack in Tunisia, U.N. Press Release SC/11823-AFR/3097 (Mar. 18, 2015);
Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Kidal, Mali, U.N. Press
Release SC/11812-AFR/3092-PKO/472 (Mar. 8, 2015); Press Release, Security
Council, Terrorist Attack in Bamako, U.N. Press Release SC/11811-AFR/3090
(Mar. 7, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, ISIL’s Destruction of Religious
and Cultural Artefacts in Mosul, U.N. Press Release SC/11804-IK/700 (Feb. 27,
2015); Press Release, Security Council, Bomb Attack in al-Qubbah, Libya, U.N.
Press Release SC/11792-AFR/3084 (Feb. 20, 2015); Press Release, Security
Council, Terrorist Attacks in Mogadishu, U.N. Press Release SC/11791AFR/3083 (Feb. 20, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Murder of 21
Egyptians, U.N. Press Release SC/11782-AFR/3078 (Feb. 15, 2015); Press
Release, Security Council, Boko Haram Attacks in Cameroon, Chad and Niger,
U.N. Press Release SC/11780-AFR/3077 (Feb. 13, 2015); Press Release, Security
Council, Murder of Muath Al-Kasasbeh, U.N. Press Release SC/11764 (Feb. 3,
2015); Press Release, Security Council, Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and
against Chadian Troops in Cameroon, U.N. Press Release SC/11763-AFR/3068
(Feb. 2, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Murder of Kenji Goto, U.N.
Press Release SC/11762-PI/2111 (Feb. 1, 2015); Press Release, Security Council,
Sinai Terrorist Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/11761 (Jan. 30, 2015); Press
Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Libya, U.N. Press Release
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B. SUMMARY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S DECISIONS AND
PRACTICES FROM 2002 TO NOVEMBER 2015, BEFORE
RESOLUTION 2249
1. Multilateralism as the First Guiding Principle in the
Fight Against Terrorist Threats

The Security Council’s decisions and practices related to
terrorism prior to Resolution 2249 involved multilateral tools
unrelated to the use of force—tools which the Council focused on,
devised, refined, and expanded.157 The council advanced these
objectives in several ways. The reality was matched by the
Council’s intention, clearly expressed in several decisions. Early
in 2003, for example, the Council expressed in Resolution 1456
that:
[T]errorism can only be defeated, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and international law, by
a sustained comprehensive approach involving the active
participation and collaboration of all States,
international and regional organizations, and by
redoubled efforts at the national level.158
This statement was reaffirmed several times over the next
decade, such as in Resolution 1735 (2006), a Chapter VII
decision, as well as in Resolution 1904 (2009), Resolution 1989
(2011), Resolution 2161 (2014), Resolution 2170 (2014); and
Resolution 2199 (2015). Furthermore, the members of the
Council, on the 10-year anniversary of 9/11, declared:
[I]n the period after the 11 September 2001 attacks,
States joined together in a spirit of cooperation to combat
terrorism, including through diplomatic efforts at and

SC/11754-AFR/3060 (Jan. 27, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Murder of
Haruna Yukawa, U.N. Press Release SC/11752 (Jan. 25, 2015); Press Release,
Security Council, Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SC/11731 (Jan. 11, 2015); Press
Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack on French Newspaper, U.N. Press
Release SC/11727-PI/2109 (Jan. 7, 2015); Press Release, Security Council,
Yemen, U.N. Press Release SC/11728 (Jan. 7, 2015).
157. Another strategy the Security Council employed prior to Resolution
2249, discussed below in Part IX, was the creation of a particular standard of
attribution to States of non-State actors’ actions.
158. S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 88, ¶ 2.
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with the United Nations, and that such cooperation is
essential and should be further strengthened.159
2. No Explicit Subsequent Security Council Decision and
Practice Related to the Right to Self-Defense Against
Autonomous Non-State Actors Between 2002 and 2015,
Before Resolution 2249
The initial post-9/11 decisions and practices of the Security
Council, specifically Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001),
related to the right of self-defense in response to terrorist
attacks. From 2002 to 2015, prior to Resolution 2249, the
Security Council adopted 36 resolutions, 20 under Chapter VII,
issued 48 presidential statements, and made 156 press
statements. None have explicitly mentioned the right to selfdefense in response to terrorist attacks. The silence is striking,
in particular, regarding the 20 legislative resolutions adopted
under Chapter VII for the purpose of dealing with terrorist
threats, since they offered the Council opportunities to make a
statement of a general character similar to that made with the
first resolution of this nature, Resolution 1373, which
highlighted the inherent right to self-defense. The Council did
not use them.
Furthermore, the Council declined to mention the inherent
right of self-defense as a result of terrorist attacks, even during
important events such as the ten- and fifteen-year anniversaries
of 9/11 and Osama Bin Laden’s death.160 The Council has,
however, condemned terrorist attacks in 12 resolutions, 32
presidential statements, and 154 press statements by members,
detailed in Section IV(A) above. So far, neither the Council nor
its several members ever referred to the right to self-defense
during 2002–2015. Not all attacks during this period were
carried out by non-State actors operating from another State, so
there was often not an explicit need to reference Article 51.
Consequently, the value of this specific silence is limited. These
and other attacks offered the Council the opportunity to make
an explicit reference to the right of self-defense, but during this
thirteen-year period, never did.161
159. Press Statement on Tenth Anniversary of 11 September 2001, supra
note 129.
160. See id. No similar releases were made on the fifteen-year anniversary
in 2016.
161. See Rep. of the S.C., at 7–8, U.N. Doc. A/57/2 (June 16, 2001)
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Although press statements, taken in isolation, are not
decisions by the Council, in the aggregate and over a significant
period of time, they reflect the position expressed by a much
larger portion of UN membership. This is a result of the
rotational character of non-permanent members—sometimes
positions expressed by non-permanent members reflect the
views of the region they represent.162 The press statements
highlighted above were made by a total of 73 members: 5
permanent and 68 non-permanent members.163 Some value
should be attached to these statements as confirming the overall
trend set by the Council in its formal decision to not mention the
right of self-defense.
In sum, there has been neither an explicit later decision nor
a practice of invoking the right of self-defense against
autonomous non-State actors prior to Resolution 2249 by the
Council or its members from 2002 to November 2015. There is,
however, still the possibility of implicit subsequent decisions and
practices in this domain during this period. To address this topic,
it is necessary to first illustrate how the Council did make
pronouncements related to Article 51 after 2002.
[hereinafter SC 2001–02]; Rep. of the S.C., at 11–12, U.N. Doc. A/58/2 (Aug. 1,
2002) [hereinafter S.C. 2002–03]; Rep. of the S.C., at 17, U.N. Doc. A/59/2 (Aug.
1, 2003) [hereinafter S.C. 2003–04]; Rep. of the S.C., at 19–21, U.N. Doc. A/60/2
(Aug. 1, 2004) [hereinafter S.C. 2004–05]; Rep. of the S.C., at 17–18, U.N. Doc.
A/60/2 (Aug. 1, 2005) [hereinafter S.C. 2005–06]; Rep. of the S.C., at 23, U.N.
Doc. A/62/2 (Aug. 1, 2006) [hereinafter S.C. 2006–07]; Rep. of the S.C., at 47–
49, U.N. Doc. A/64/2 (Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter S.C. 2008–09]; Rep. of the S.C.,
U.N. Doc. A/65/2 (Aug. 1, 2009) [hereinafter S.C. 2009–10]; Rep. of the S.C., at
35, U.N. Doc. A/66/2 (Aug. 1, 2010) [hereinafter S.C. 2010–11]; Rep. of the S.C.,
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/67/2 (Aug. 1, 2011) [hereinafter S.C. 2011–12]; Rep. of the
S.C., at 64–65, U.N. Doc. A/68/2 (Aug. 1, 2012) [hereinafter S.C. 2012–13]; Rep.
of the S.C., at 70–71, U.N. Doc. A/69/2 (Aug. 1, 2013) [hereinafter S.C. 2013–
14].
162. See SIEVERS & DAWS, supra note 25, at 129.
163. The non-permanent members from 2001 to 2015 were: Algeria, Angola,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Colombia, Congo,
Costa Rica, Chad, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico,
Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines,
Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovakia,
South Africa, Spain, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Togo,
Venezuela, and Vietnam. See S.C. 2001–02, supra note 161, at 267; S.C. 2002–
03, supra note 161, at 201; S.C. 2003–04, supra note 161, at 211; S.C. 2004–05,
supra note 161, at 223; S.C. 2005–06, supra note 161, at 223; S.C. 2006–07,
supra note 161, at 231; S.C. 2008–09, supra note 161, at 241; S.C. 2010–11,
supra note 161, at 219; S.C. 2012–13, supra note 161, at 252.
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V. EXPLICIT SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS
RELATED TO ARTICLE 51 OUTSIDE THE
REALM OF TERRORISM FROM 2001 TO 2011
Contrary to the lack of an explicit decision regarding to the
right to self-defense from 2002 to 2015 in the context of terrorist
threats, the Council did explicitly mention Article 51 several
times in another realm: States’ right to import, produce, and
retain small arms and light weapons. Before going into these
references, however, a little history to show the Council’s
determinations in this regard should be considered.
The Council has referenced the right to self-defense fifteen
times in its history. According to the Repertoire of the Practice
of the Security Council, these references to the right to selfdefense took place about once per decade between 1950 and
1990, with Resolutions 95 (1951),164 255 (1968),165 403 (1977),166
and Resolution 574 (1985);167 four times in the 1990s with
Resolutions 661 (1990) after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,168
Resolution 984 (1995), 169 Resolution 1134 (1999) (referring to
the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo),170 and
164. S.C. Res. 95, ¶ 3 (Sept. 1, 1951); U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY
COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1946–51, Chapter XI at 450, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/1, U.N.
Sales No. [not provided] (1954).
165. See S.C. Res. 255, ¶ 3 (June 19, 1968); REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE
OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1966–68, supra note 15, Chapter
XI at 217–18.
166. See S.C. Res. 403, ¶ 5 (Jan. 14, 1977); U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL AND
SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL:
SUPPLEMENT
1975–80
(1987),
Chapter
XI
at
402,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/75-80/75-80_11.pdf#page=4.
[hereinafter
REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT
1975–80].
167. S.C. Res. 574, ¶ 4 (Oct. 7 1985); U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL AND SEC.
COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1985–88, Chapter XI at 427, U.N. Doc.
ST/DPA/1/Add.10, U.N. Sales No. E.98 VII.1 (2000).
168. See S.C. Res. 661, pmbl. ¶ 6 (Aug. 6, 1990); U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL
AND SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1989–92, Chapter XI at 934, U.N. Doc.
ST/PSCA/1/Add.11, U.N. Sales No. 05.VII.1 (2007).
169. See S.C. Res. 984, ¶ 9 (April 11, 1995); U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL AND
SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1993–95, Chapter XI at 1147, U.N. Doc.
ST/PSCA/1/Add.12, U.N. Sales No. E.10.VII.2 (2009).
170. See S.C. Res. 1234, pmbl. ¶ 8 (Apr. 9, 1999); U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL
AND SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N.
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the presidential statement of September 24, 1999 (addressing
small arms).171 A similar statement was made once in the new
millennium prior to 9/11 with the presidential statement of
September 4, 2001.172 Post-9/11 brought Resolutions 1368 and
1373, along with four others. In its presidential statement of
October 31, 2002, the Council reaffirmed:
[T]he inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations and, subject to the Charter, the right
of each State to import, produce and retain small arms
and light weapons for its self-defence and security
needs.173
This reference to the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense was made again by the Council in its presidential
statements of January 19, 2004, and February 17, 2005.174
Lastly, in the presidential statement of March 19, 2010, the
Council made reference to the right to self-defense in connection
with the “Central African region.” It stated:
The Security Council, while acknowledging the right of
all States to manufacture, import, export, transfer and
retain the Conventional arms for self-defence and
security needs consistent with international law and the
Charter of the United Nations, underlines the vital
SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1996–99, Chapter XI at 1168, U.N. Doc.
ST/PSCA/1/Add.13, U.N. Sales No. 10.VII.3 (2009) [hereinafter REPERTOIRE OF
THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1996–99].
171. See S.C. Pres. Statement 1999/28 (Sept. 24, 1999); REPERTOIRE OF THE
PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1996–99, supra note
170, Chapter XI at 1168.
172. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2001/21 (Sept. 4, 2001); REPERTOIRE OF THE
PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 2000–03, supra note
44, Chapter XI at 1005.
173. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2002/30 (Oct. 31, 2002); see also REPERTOIRE OF THE
PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 2000–03, supra note
44, Chapter XI at 1004–05.
174. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the
Security Council, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/7 (Feb. 17, 2005); U.N. President
of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/PRST/2004/1 (Jan. 19, 2004); U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL AND SEC. COUNCIL
AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL:
SUPPLEMENT 2004–07, Chapter XI at 1022, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/1/Add.15, U.N.
Sales No. 13.VII.1 (2013).
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importance of effective regulations and controls of the
transparent trade in SALW (small arms and light
weapons) in order to prevent their illegal diversion and
re-export.175
These four decisions, unrelated to terrorism, represent more
than twenty-five percent of the Council’s references to selfdefense. This fact correlates with the lack of subsequent
decisions regarding Article 51 in relation to autonomous nonState actors from 2002 to 2015 and before Resolution 2249.
In sum, the lack of explicit subsequent decisions related to
Article 51 in the context of terrorism is not owed to the fact that
the Council is not expected to adopt decisions related to the right
to self-defense, or that it lacks the capacity to do so. The
Council’s prior decisions in regard to Article 51 in other domains
suggest this inaction in connection with armed terrorist attacks
is a deliberate policy choice.
VI.

LACK OF IMPLICIT SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE
BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM 2002 TO
2015 RELATED TO TERRORIST ACTS ABLE TO
EXPAND ARTICLE 51 TO COVER
AUTONOMOUS NON-STATE ACTORS IN
GENERAL

Could it be that the Security Council carried out implicit
subsequent decisions and practices that, in addition to
Resolutions 1368 and 1373, could have expanded the scope of
Article 51 to include armed attacks by autonomous terrorist
groups before Resolution 2249, but failed to do so?176 What
175. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2010/6 (Mar. 19, 2010); see also U.N. DEP’T OF
POLITICAL AND SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 2010–11, Chapter VII at 160–61, U.N.
Doc. ST/PSCA/1/Add.17, U.N. Sales No. E.15.VII.1 (2016).
176. Resolution 2249 is an implicit decision in connection with Article 51. It
does not mention the precept, but it is clear that the use of the words “take all
necessary measures” includes self-defense actions. The Council has implicitly
recognized the right to self-defense before with Resolution 403 (1977). See
REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT
1975–80, supra note 166, Chapter XI at 402. This explicit expression is as
follows:
[The Security Council] Takes cognizance of the special economic
hardship confronting Botswana as a result of the imperative need to
divert funds from ongoing and planned development projects to
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exactly constitutes an implicit decision and practice relevant for
the purpose of the expansion of the right to self-defense is an
open question. However, after the review of all the decisions by
the Council from 2002 to November 2015 before Resolution 2249,
the present author has identified the following circumstances
that could be regarded as implicit decisions and practices not to
expand the scope of Article 51:
(i)

The permanent reaffirmation by the Council of
Resolution 1373 in almost all of its post-9/11
resolutions177 and presidential statements,
which would include the resolution’s reference to
the right to self-defense. This would suggest an
implicit subsequent decision for the purpose of
the expansion of Article 51.

(ii)

The reaffirmation in several resolutions,
presidential statements, and press statements
during the period 2002–2014 of “the need to
combat by all means, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, threats to
international peace and security caused by
terrorist acts” or very similar wording.178 The

hitherto unplanned and unbudgeted security measures necessitated
by the urgent need effectively to defend itself against attacks and
threats by the illegal régime in Sothern Rhodesia.
S.C. Res. 403, ¶ 5 (Jan. 14, 1977).
177. See S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 80; S.C. Res. 1452, supra note 81; S.C.
Res. 1456, supra note 88; S.C. Res. 1465, supra note 89; S.C. Res. 1516, supra
note 89; S.C. Res. 1530, supra note 79; S.C. Res. 1535, supra note 94; S.C. Res.
1566, supra note 95; S.C. Res. 1611, supra note 102; S.C. Res. 1617, supra note
99; S.C. Res. 1618, supra note 103; S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 100; S.C. Res.
1735, supra note 125; S.C. Res. 1787, supra note 110; S.C. Res. 1805, supra note
114; S.C. Res. 1822, supra note 115; S.C. Res. 1904, supra note 118; S.C. Res.
1963, supra note 121; S.C. Res. 1988, supra note 125; S.C. Res. 1989, supra note
126; S.C. Res. 2082, supra note 131; S.C. Res. 2083, supra note 132; S.C. Res.
2129, supra note 135; S.C. Res. 2133, supra note 138; S.C. Res. 2160, supra note
139; S.C. Res. 2161, supra note 140; S.C. Res. 2199, supra note 58; S.C. Res.
2214, supra note 153.
178. See S.C. Res. 1438, supra note 83; S.C. Res. 1450, supra note 83; S.C.
Res. 1455, supra note 87; S.C. Res. 1526, supra note 93; S.C. Res. 1530, supra
note 79; S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 38; S.C. Res. 1611, supra note 79; S.C. Res.
1617, supra note 99; S.C. Res. 1618, supra note 103; S.C. Res. 1624, supra note
100; S.C. Res. 1735, supra note 107; S.C. Res. 1822, supra note 115; S.C. Res.
1904, supra note 118; S.C. Res. 1989, supra note 126; S.C. Res. 2133, supra note
138; S.C. Res. 2160, supra note 139; S.C. Res. 2161, supra note 140; S.C. Res.
2178, supra note 142; S.C. Res. 2199, supra note 58.
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use of the word “all” would tacitly be including
the right to self-defense.179
(iii)

The Council sometimes recognized “that
terrorism will not be defeated by military force,
law enforcement measures, and intelligence
operations alone” in Resolutions 1963 (2010),180
2129 (2013),181 and 2178 (2014),182 as well as the
presidential statement issued by the Council on
September 27, 2010.183 This suggests that the
use of force in self-defense against non-State
actors is a form of military force, which was not
excluded by the statement and is, therefore,
implicitly allowed.

The fact that there might be some implicit subsequent
decisions and practices does not immediately lead to the
conclusion that any of them in isolation or all of them put
together, when combined with Resolutions 1368 and 1373, have
achieved the expansion of Article 51 to cover armed attacks by
autonomous non-State actors.184 In order to address this issue,
each of the implicit practices will be assessed individually and
then collectively.
A. REAFFIRMATION OF RESOLUTION 1373
Although it constitutes an implicit subsequent decision
related to Article 51, the constant reaffirmation of Resolution
1373 by the Council in almost all of the resolutions related to
179. In the past, for instance, the use by the Council of the expression “take
all measures necessary to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity under
the Charter” has been understood by some UN Member States to include the
right to self-defense. See REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1985–88, supra note 166, Chapter XI at 428. To be sure,
the expressions “the need to combat by all means” and “take all measures
necessary” do not have the same meaning for the Council.
180. See S.C. Res. 1963, supra note 121, pmbl. ¶ 4.
181. See S.C. Res. 2129, supra note 135, pmbl. ¶ 3.
182. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 142, pmbl. ¶ 14.
183. See Presidential Statement of 27 September 2010, supra note 123, ¶ 7.
184. It is important to mention that any implicit subsequent practice by the
Council, in principle, would not be able to expand Article 51 on its own from
2001 to 2015, before Resolution 2249. The expansion, though, could exist as a
result of assessing the self-defense declarations in Resolutions 1368 and 1373,
in light of implicit decisions and practices by the Council.
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terrorist threats from 2002 to November 2015 does not in itself
expand the right to self-defense against autonomous non-State
actors in general or when combined with Resolutions 1368 and
1373. Rather, the reaffirmation of Resolution 1373 must be seen
in the context of the thematic connection between Resolution
1373 and the subsequent reaffirming resolution in, mainly, their
operative parts. While Resolution 1373 has a statement related
to self-defense, the thrust of the resolution in the operative part
contains a multilateral effort to face the threats that terrorism
poses to international peace and security. Thus, if the
reaffirming resolution is multilateral in character and unrelated
to the use of force in terms of the contents of its operative part,
as has been the case with all of the resolutions prior to
Resolution 2249,185 the reaffirmation of Resolution 1373 must be
understood to refer mainly to the latter’s multilateral nature.
Consequently, the reaffirmation of Resolution 1373 by almost
every post-9/11 resolution should not be seen as adding much
substance to what the Council states in Resolutions 1368 and
1373 in relation to Article 51 against terrorist attacks by
autonomous non-State actors.
B. REAFFIRMATION OF THE NEED TO COMBAT BY “ALL”
MEANS
As to the second implicit practice, the Council has
reaffirmed in multiple resolutions and presidential statements
“the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, threats to international peace and
security caused by terrorist acts,” or very similar wording,186 as
tacitly including the right to self-defense. It is possible to say
that the implicit practice of using “all means” has important
limits in contributing to the expansion of Article 51. In effect,
this conclusion is supported by a contextual element of
Resolution 1373, where the reference to the right to self-defense
immediately precedes the use of the expression “to combat by all
means.” The post-9/11 anti-terrorism resolutions therefore
include “to combat by all means” and omit the “right to selfdefense.”

185. Resolution 2249 is also multilateral, but of a different nature in the
sense that it endorses the use of force against ISIL by any State with the
capacity to do so. See S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 13.
186. See supra note 177.
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When seen in light of the explicit multilateral effort to
address terrorist threats, this omission is not an oversight by the
Council. Thus, what this reaffirmed statement adds to
Resolutions 1373 and 1368 is not enough to achieve an
expansion of Article 51. The same can be said of the use of “to
combat by all means” in Resolution 2249. It is incorporated in
the preamble,187 and by including the call upon members to take
all necessary measures in the operative part of the resolution,
the Council gives further evidence that the statement alone does
not imply the use of force in self-defense.
C. REAFFIRMATION THAT TERRORISM WILL NOT BE
DEFEATED BY MILITARY FORCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT
MEASURES, AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ALONE
The third argument in support of implicit subsequent
decisions and practices is that the Council has recognized in
several resolutions and presidential statements that “terrorism
will not be defeated by military force, law enforcement
measures, and intelligence operations alone.” Self-defense would
be one of the military actions tacitly included. To assess the
merits of this argument, it is important to look at the context of
the statement in the Council’s decisions to determine whether or
not it can be said that the statement contains an implicit
decision supporting an expansion of Article 51 to include
autonomous non-State actors. The context of the statement in
the three decisions, Resolutions 1963, 2129, and 2178, does not
support such inference, principally because all three decisions
highlight multinational efforts as being fundamental to the fight
against terrorism. Resolutions 1963 and 2129 contain the
following statement in their preamble:
[T]hat all Member States must cooperate fully in the
fight against terrorism . . . 188
Reiterating its call upon Member States to enhance their
cooperation and solidarity, particularly through bilateral
and multilateral arrangements and agreements to
prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and encourages

187. See S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 13, pmbl. ¶ 7.
188. See S.C. Res. 1963, supra note 121, pmbl. ¶ 10; S.C. Res. 2129, supra
note 135, pmbl. ¶ 18.
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Member States to strengthen cooperation at the regional
and subregional level . . . .189

For its part, Resolution 2178 also proclaims:
[U]nderlining the need for Member States to act
cooperatively to prevent terrorists from exploiting
technology, communications and resources to incite
support for terrorist acts, while respecting human rights
and fundamental freedoms . . . .
Noting recent developments and initiatives at the
international, regional and subregional levels to prevent
and suppress international terrorism . . . .190
Given the clear emphasis on multilateral efforts, it is unlikely
that the statement on limitations on the use of military force
might alone expand Article 51 to cover armed attacks by
autonomous non-State actors in general. On the other hand, it
would not be logical that a statement recognizing the limitations
on the use of force could make an important contribution to the
expansion of the right to use force in self-defense. For these
reasons, the said statement would not even qualify as an implicit
subsequent decision for this purpose.
D. SUBSEQUENT IMPLICIT PRACTICES AS A WHOLE
The fourth and final proposed argument is whether the
foregoing implicit determinations, taken together, count as
subsequent decisions capable of expanding the scope of Article
51 prior to Resolution 2249. That is to say, would Resolutions
1368 and 1373, coupled with the widely reaffirmed “all means”
statement, have expanded Article 51 to cover autonomous nonState actors?
This comprehensive argument must be answered in an
equally holistic way and in the context of other resolutions and
later UN practices. This context is made up of the 37 resolutions,
48 presidential statements, and 156 press statements in which
189. See S.C. Res. 1963, supra note 121, pmbl. ¶ 15; S.C. Res. 2129, supra
note 135, pmbl. ¶ 26. The presidential statement of September 27, 2010, also
contains a statement of virtually identical wording. See Presidential Statement
of 27 September 2010, supra note 123, ¶ 11.
190. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 142, pmbl. ¶¶ 15, 17.
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the Council, when dealing with terrorist threats, explicitly
embarked on a multinational effort from 2002 until 2015 without
ever mentioning Article 51. Secondly, the presidential
statements of October 31, 2002, January 19, 2004, February 15,
2005, and March 19, 2010—in which the Council made an
explicit reference to the right to self-defense in the realm of arms
control191—indicate that from 2002 to November 2015, whenever
the Council regarded a situation to merit reference to the right,
it did so.
The subsequent implicit expansion of the right to selfdefense against autonomous non-State actors seems to be
limited in light of the above-mentioned context. This is a
conclusion that is not affected by the tacit reference to Article 51
in Resolution 2249, as it exclusively focused on ISIL. However,
the fact that the Council’s subsequent explicit decisions and
practices focused on the development of multilateral
instruments from 2002 to 2015, prior to Resolution 2249, did not
mean that the references to the inherent right in Resolutions
1368 and 1373 were tacitly rejected. In effect, this is because the
unilateral and multilateral tools used to address terrorist
threats did not exclude each other, as Resolution 1373
illustrates.192
Finally, at this stage of the analysis, it is worth coming back
to Resolution 2249 to assess the argument that it endorsed the
United States’ and France’s arguments that self-defensive
actions against autonomous non-State actors did not require the
innocent State’s consent. If, as was mandated by the Court in
Kosovo, the interpretation of the scope of Resolution 2249 must
take into account other resolutions on the same subject-matter,
then the interpretation that emerges is one that denies
Resolution 2249 any wider effects beyond ISIL in Syria and Iraq,
as such effects are not supported in any previous decisions or
practices by the Council (which said nothing related to selfdefense beyond the important but inconclusive 9/11
Resolutions).

191. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2002/30, supra note 173, at 1; S.C. Pres.
Statement 2004/1, supra note 174, at 1; S.C. Pres. Statement 2005/7, supra note
174, at 1; S.C. Pres. Statement 2010/6, supra note 175, at 1.
192. See generally Wood, supra note 38, at 318–19 (discussing the law
enforcement approach in contrast to the “armed conflict” approach taken by the
Security Council and other United Nation bodies to combat terrorism).
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VII.

MULTILATERALISM IN THE FIGHT AGAINST
TERRORISM IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
FROM 2001 TO 2015.

Pursuant to Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council
has primary but not exclusive responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security.193 The General Assembly
also has, within certain limits provided for in Article 11 of the
Charter,194 competences in this particular domain, as the
International Court of Justice expressed in Nicaragua and in the
Wall opinion.195 In light of both the Charter’s instruction to the
Assembly to consider the principle of cooperation in the
maintenance of international peace and security in the latter
provision, and of the way the Assembly has applied it,196 it is not
surprising to find that the position the Assembly has taken in
respect to terrorism has been consistent with this principle.
In effect, the resolutions adopted by the General
Assembly related to terrorism have all been guided by an
active promotion of multilateral efforts. Contrary to the
Security Council’s response in the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks, the General Assembly has always focused only
on the multinational effort to fight terrorism. For
193. Article 24.1 states:
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations,
its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that
in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council
acts on their behalf.
U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.
194. Article 11.2 states:
The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by
any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a
state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with
Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may
make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state
or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such
question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security
Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.
U.N. Charter art. 11, ¶ 2.
195. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 95; Legal Consequences of the
Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 26 (July 9).
196. See Eckart Klein & Stefanie Schmahl, Ch. IV The General Assembly,
Functions and Powers, Article 11, 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A
COMMENTARY 494–98 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012).
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example, while strongly condemning the attacks, the
Assembly urgently called in Resolution 56/1 (2011): “[f]or
international cooperation to prevent and eradicate acts
of terrorism, and stresses that those responsible for
aiding, supporting, or harbouring the perpetrators,
organizers and sponsors of such acts will be held
accountable.197
Subsequent decisions have strengthened this path.
Resolution 60/1, for example, contained the 2005 World Summit
Outcome,198 in which the General Assembly reiterated the
prohibition of the use of force in a manner inconsistent with the
Charter and reaffirmed that “[t]he relevant provisions of the
Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to
international peace and security.”199 The resolution proceeded
with a section on terrorism, based on multilateral tools only. It
recalled the need for States to refrain from supporting terrorist
organizations in any way, the necessary cooperation between
States in conformity with international law, and the role of the
United Nations and the contribution of bilateral and regional
cooperation to face this challenge, among other issues.
The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was
adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 60/288 of
September 8, 2006.200 It is based on four pillars: (i) measures to
address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; (ii)
measures to prevent and combat terrorism; (iii) measures to
build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to
strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this domain;
and (iv) measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and
the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against
terrorism.201 The second pillar, measures to prevent and combat
terrorism, listed 18 measures.202 It started with a call for
refraining from supporting terrorist activities—giving explicit
support to the Council’s decision in this area203—and proceeded
with calls to members for cooperation and extradition and for

197. G.A. Res. 56/1, ¶ 4 (Sept. 12, 2001).
198. See G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 5 (Oct. 24, 2005).
199. Id. ¶ 79.
200. See G.A. Res. 60/288 (Sept. 8, 2006).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 5–7.
203. See, S.C. Res. 1189, ¶ 5 (Aug. 13, 1998); Resolution 1373, supra note 44,
¶¶ 2(a), 2(c); see also Section VIII, infra.
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their becoming parties to the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized crime and its protocols.204 It also called
for coordination between relevant regional organizations and for
cooperation with the CTC and the Resolution 1267 Committee,
among others.205
The first examination of the implementation of the strategy
took place in Resolution 62/272 (2008), in which, among other
statements of a multilateral nature, the General Assembly
reaffirmed “[t]he need to enhance international cooperation in
countering terrorism . . . .”206 The second examination of the
strategy was carried out by the General Assembly in Resolution
64/297 (2010). It contains a reaffirmation of several multilateral
tools: international cooperation between States and coordination
between regional organizations, guided by the following
statement, among others: “Renewing its unwavering
commitment to strengthening international cooperation to
prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations.” 207 The third examination of the strategy was
made by the Assembly in Resolution 66/282 (2012), which
followed the multinational orientation in terms already
highlighted.208 The fourth examination took place in 2014 in
Resolution 68/276. It highlights again the multilateral
instruments mentioned above, and reaffirms that acts of
terrorism are aimed at “[t]hreatening territorial integrity and
the security of States . . . .”209 Furthermore, it “[u]nderlines the
importance of multilateral efforts in combating terrorism and
refraining from any practices and measures inconsistent with
international law and the principles of the Charter.”210
Clearly, there is no subsequent practice within the UN
General Assembly related to the right to self-defense against
autonomous non-State actors. Although this conclusion is not
surprising, it lends further support to the lack of expansion of
Article 51 to cover these actors.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 200, at 5, ¶ 6.
See id. at 5–7.
G.A. Res. 62/272, ¶ 10 (Sept. 15, 2008).
G.A. Res. 64/297, pmbl. ¶ 4 (Oct. 13, 2010).
See G.A. Res. 66/282 (July 12, 2012).
G.A. Res. 68/276, pmbl. ¶ 13 (June 24, 2014).
Id. ¶ 26.
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CAN STATE PRACTICE UNDER ARTICLE 51 ON
ITS OWN HAVE EXPANDED THE SCOPE OF
ARTICLE 51 TO COVER ARMED ATTACKS
FROM ANY AUTONOMOUS NON-STATE
ACTOR?

The International Court included in the Kosovo opinion that
State practice was an element to be considered regarding the
interpretation of Security Council resolutions, which in turn
could have an impact on the expansion of any Charter
provision.211 Whether State practice alone from 2002 to 2015,
and in particular during the years 2014 and 2015, could have
achieved this result regarding Article 51 is a different matter.212
A thorough assessment of such practice goes beyond the scope of
this Article;213 however, it is possible to say that the practice is
far from being uniform, even between the permanent members

211. Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403,
¶ 94 (July 22) (“The interpretation of Security Council resolutions may require
the Court to analyse . . . other resolutions of the Security Council on the same
issue, as well as the subsequent practice . . . of States affected by those given
resolutions.”).
212. Reisman and Armstrong argue that the right to self-defense against
autonomous non-State actors crystallized into customary practice on the basis
of State practice shortly after 9/11. See Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 2, at
538; 548; see also Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20
EUR. J. INT’L L. 359, 391–92 (2009). But see Cassese, supra note 2, at 997;
Guillaume, supra note 2, at 547:
It has thus been emphasized that it would that dubious to derive an
instantaneous custom from one isolated precedent. It has further been
observed that this evolution would amount to such radical change in
international law that it would require a clearer practice and more
constant opinio juris.
213. A future project might assess the topic in detail, particularly in light of
the International Law Commission’s Report on Identification of Customary
International Law. See Bernard H. Oxman, Some Observations on the Draft
Conclusions on Identification of Customary Law Provisionally Adopted by the
ILC’s Drafting Committee at the Sixty-Sixth Session, AJIL UNBOUND (Dec. 23,
2014, 2:57PM), https://www.asil.org/blogs/some-observations-draft-conclusionsidentification-customary-law-provisionally-adopted-ilc’s; Edward T. Swaine,
Identifying Customary International Law: First Thoughts on the ILC’s First
Steps, AJIL UNBOUND (Dec. 23, 2014, 3:03PM), https://www.asil.org/blogs/
identifying-customary-international-law-first-thoughts-ilc’s-first-steps;
Michael Wood & Omri Sender, Identifying the Rules for Customary
International Law: Response from Michael Wood and Omri Sender, AJIL
UNBOUND (Jan. 8, 2015, 9:09AM), https://www.asil.org/blogs/identifying-rulesidentifying-customary-international-law-response-micahel-wood-and-omri.
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of the Council, whose practice regarding ISIL before Resolution
2249 is evidence.
The United States and France, for example, have claimed
Article 51 without Syrian consent,214 while Russia and China
opposed the invocation without Syrian consent,215 and in
September 2014 the United Kingdom similarly expressed that
its intervention in Syria required such consent.216 Later, in
November 2014, the United Kingdom changed its position and
notified the Council that it had taken collective self-defensive
action against ISIL in Syria in support of Iraq without consent
from Syria.217 Subsequently, the United Kingdom invoked its
own right to self-defense against ISIL in Syria, in addition to the
collective-right of Iraq, in September 2015.218 Then, after
resolution 2249, the United Kingdom notified the Council that it
was taking necessary and proportionate self-defensive measures
against ISIL in Syria, citing the resolution as a legal basis.219
Although the United Kingdom changed its approach in
2015, its practice is recent,220 and it is not without hesitations.
After invoking Resolution 2249 and Article 51, an official

214. Permanent Rep. of the U.K. of Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. to the U.N., Identical
Letters dated 25 November 2014 from the Permanent Rep. of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations
Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2014/851 (Nov. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Identical Letters dated 25
Nov. 2014].
215. See Blanchard, supra note 57; Black & Roberts, supra note 57, at 2.
216. Griff Witte & Rebecca Collard, Britain, Denmark and Belgium Join Air
Campaign Against Islamic State, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/refugees-flee-islamic-state-bid-toclaim-strategic-town-as-airstrikes-expand/2014/09/26/332a73f2-4570-11e4b437-1a7368204804_story.html?utm_term=.3a51bf5707d0.
217. See Identical Letters dated 25 November 2014, supra note 214..
218. Permanent Rep. of the U.K. of Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. to the U.N., Letter
Dated 7 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/688 (Sept.
8, 2015) [hereinafter Letter Dated 7 September 2015].
219. Permanent Rep. of the U.K. of Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. to the U.N., Letter
Dated 3 December 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/3 December
2015/928 (Dec. 3, 2015).
220. One of the latest statements endorsing the new approach was made by
the United Kingdom´s Attorney-General. Rt. Hon. Jeremy Wright, QC MP,
U.K., Address at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Jan. 11,
2017) (outlining the contemporary developments in the use of force and the
United Kingdom’s position on self defence).
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document of the House of Commons, Legal Basis for UK Military
Action in Syria, concluded: “However, when the armed attack
comes from a ‘non-state actor’ such as ISIS/Daesh, based in a
state that is ‘unwilling or unable’ to prevent the attack, the
international law is not entirely clear.”221 Without further
reviewing State practice regarding Article 51 predating ISIL—
carried out, among others, by the United States, the United
Kingdom,222 Israel,223 Iran,224 Russia,225 and Kenya226—the
above-mentioned limited review shows that the UN practice is
not a model of uniformity. As such, States would face great
difficulty in relying on the notion of State practice to
demonstrate the expansion of Article 51 to cover autonomous
non-State actors, especially since, following the Kosovo opinion,
State actions were to be assessed in light of the 84 decisions
adopted by the Council with its lack of reference to the right of
self-defense. The bar is certainly high: as noted by Nolte and
Randelzhofer, “[t]he conditions for the recognition of a
significant reinterpretation of, or superseding exception to, Art.
51 are strict.”227

221. Lang, supra note 69, ¶ 10. For the argument that the United Kingdom
could invoke Article 51 against ISIL in Syria without Syrian consent (prior to
Resolution 2249), see Letter Dated 7 September 2015, supra note 218.
222. See Press Statement on Terrorist Threats, supra note 10.
223. See Permanent Rep. of Isr. to the U.N., Security Council, Identical
Letters dated 8 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/58/424-S/2003/972 (Oct. 9, 2003).
224. Iran invoked the right to self-defense against non-State actors
operating from Iraq on April 18, 2001. See Rep. of the S.C., at 1016, Chapter XI
(2001–2003).
225. See Permanent Rep. of Russ. Federation to the U.N., Letter Dated 11
September 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
S/2002/1012 (Sept. 12, 2002).
226. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on
Somalia, U.N. Doc. S/2011/759 (Dec. 9, 2011).
227. NOLTE & RANDELZHOFER, supra note 15, at 1400.
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IX.

THE INDIRECT EXPANSION OF ARTICLE 51
THROUGH A NEW STANDARD OF
ATTRIBUTION UNDER THE SECURITY
COUNCIL’S RESOLUTIONS ON TERRORISM
1998–2015

Sections IV to VI of this Article focused on what the Security
Council did not do from 2002 to 2015: expand Article 51 to cover
armed attacks from any autonomous non-State actor.228 Section
VIII will focus on what the Council did—the indirect expansion
of Article 51—in relation to the right to self-defense during this
period regarding threats to international peace and security
caused by non-State actors in general. It did this through the
creation, in the domain of terrorism, of a standard of attribution
to States of acts carried out by non-State actors that is less strict
than that of customary international law.
The Court has established the standard of effective control
to determine when actions by non-State actors could be
attributed to a State. The standard has in the past been relevant
to the application of Article 51 to determine when an armed
attack carried out by a non-State actor can be attributed to a
State.229 The “effective control” test is based on the customary
rule embodied in Article 8 of the International Law
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, according to
which “[t]he conduct of a person or group of persons shall be
considered an act of a State under international law if the person
or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or
under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the
conduct.”230 However, despite this provision there is nothing
preventing the development of other standards of attribution
applicable to the UN Charter and in particular to Article 51. In
fact, some have suggested that Resolution 1373 lowered the
threshold of attribution applicable to non-State actors in the
domain of threats to international peace and security caused by
terrorist acts.231 In other words, the Security Council’s standard
228. See id. at 1417.
229. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115; Armed Activities on
Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep.
168, ¶ 146 (Dec. 19).
230. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility]. Beginning on
page 59, the International Law Commission provides commentaries on each of
the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts.
231. See Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security
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would cover armed attacks by non-State actors that would not
meet the threshold of customary international law.
A lower threshold would be the result of the combined effect
in Resolution 1373 of the reference to the right to self-defense in
the preamble and of paragraph 2 of the operative part, providing:
2. Decides also that all States shall:
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or
passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts,
including by suppressing recruitment of members of
terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons
to terrorists;
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support,
or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens; 232
The argument would suggest that, on the basis of Resolution
1373, terrorist acts that qualify as armed attacks carried out by
non-State actors with the active or passive support of a State
would be attributed to the latter, and it would justify the
invocation of the right to self-defense by the injured State. This
Section, however, shows the legal foundations of this particular
standard of attribution, based on decisions by the Council from
1998 to 2015, and most importantly, that the Council itself has
already applied the standard.
In effect, the Council attributed the 9/11 attacks to the
Taliban regime, despite the fact that Al-Qaida’s attacks hardly
met the requirements of the rules of attribution under
customary international law.233 In effect, the Council clearly did
so in the presidential statement of September 11, 2002, which
stated:
The international community has responded to the
atrocities
of
11
September
with
unyielding
determination. A broad coalition of States has taken
action against the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and their
supporters. It did so in defense of common values and
common security. Consistent with the high purposes of
Fence and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 52, 58 (2005).
232. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 45, ¶¶ 2(a), 2(c).
233. See TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER:
EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 440 (2010).
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this institution and the provisions of the United Nations
Charter, the coalition continues to pursue those
responsible.234

As can be seen, the Council attributed the 9/11 attacks to the
Taliban and regarded the self-defensive acts by United States
and the United Kingdom as lawful under the Charter.
This determination by the Council in terms of attribution to
the Taliban of Al-Qaida’s 9/11 attacks had its roots in four
previous resolutions; the Council’s standard in the domain of
terrorism was already in the making before Resolution 1373.
Indeed, Resolution 1189 (1998) stressed a general obligation for
UN membership: “[e]very Member State has the duty to refrain
from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized
activities within its territory directed towards the commission of
such acts.”235 Later, Resolution 1193 (1998) demanded “Afghan
factions to refrain from harbouring and training terrorists and
their organizations and to halt illegal drug activities”;236 and
Resolution 1214 (1998) condemned the Taliban for allowing
territory controlled by it to be used “for the sheltering and
training of terrorists and the planning of terrorist acts and
reiterating that the suppression of international terrorism [was]
essential for the maintenance of international peace and
security.”237 In Resolution 1267 (1999), under Chapter VII, the
Council made a similar condemnation and both in the preamble
and in the operative part of this decision focused on the support
the Taliban was giving to Bin Laden.238 The Council went
further in Resolution 1333 (2000) by ordering the Taliban “to
close all camps where terrorists are trained within the territory
under its control.”239
State practice before the Council under Article 51 also
supported this development. Prior to 9/11, the United States had
already attributed to the Taliban regimen an Al-Qaida attack
against U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam,
Tanzania, and basing its action on Article 51, the United States
234. Statement by the President of the Security Council on Sept. 11, 2002,
supra note 55, ¶ 4.
235. S.C. Res. 1189, supra note 203, ¶ 5.
236. S.C. Res. 1193, ¶ 15 (Aug. 28, 1998).
237. S.C. Res. 1214, ¶ 12 (Dec. 8, 1998).
238. S.C. Res. 1267, pmbl. ¶¶ 5–6, ¶¶ 1–2.
239. S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 93, ¶ 3.
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had attacked Al-Qaida bases in Afghanistan. The United States
expressed that its attacks “were carried out only after repeated
efforts to convince the Government of the Sudan and the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan to shut these terrorist activities down and
to cease their cooperation with the Bin Laden organization.”240
In sum, the set of resolutions from 1998 to 2001 established
a new standard of attribution for non-State actors’ actions to
States in the realm of terrorism, and the presidential statement
made by the Council on September 11, 2002, applied this
standard by attributing Al-Qaida’s actions to the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan. Consequently, the existence of this special
standard of attribution is not only an inference to be made in
light of Resolutions 1189 (1998), 1193 (1998), 1214 (1998), 1267
(1999), 1333 (2000), and 1373 (2001), but a reality in light of its
application by the Council in its September 11, 2002,
presidential statement.
Could it be said that this presidential statement does not
imply an attribution of the 9/11 attacks to Afghanistan, since
Afghanistan is not explicitly mentioned there? The key issue is
not whether Afghanistan is mentioned, but whether the Taliban
were sometimes regarded by the Council as public authorities or
with sufficient links to Afghan public organs. Once it has been
shown that in the eyes of the Council the Taliban was a public
authority, not a mere non-State actor, then the presidential
statement connecting Al-Qaida’s 9/11 attacks to a State
authority and its attribution to Afghanistan necessarily follows
by virtue of Article 10.1 of the International Law Commission´s
Articles on State Responsibility.241
After its removal from power at the end of 2001, the Taliban
became a non-State actor, but after taking Kabul in September
1996 and until 9/11, the Security Council and the United
Nations sometimes treated the Taliban as public authorities.
Evidence of this treatment abounds. First, in the fact that the
Council sometimes made reference to the “Taliban authorities.”
In effect, when commenting on Resolution 1267 (1999), the
240. Permanent Rep. of U.S. to the U.N., Letter Dated August 20, 1998 from
the Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the United Nations Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, UN. Doc. S/1998/70 (Aug. 20, 1998).
241. The basis of this attribution is Article 10.1 of the International Law
Commission´s Articles on State Responsibility, which provides for:
The conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new
Government of a State shall be considered an act of that State under
international law.
Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 230, at 45 art. 10(1).
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Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council spoke of the
“failure of the Taliban authorities to respond to the demands in
resolution 1214 (1998) . . . .”242 Second, Taliban decisions were
sometimes called “measures” in Security Council Resolutions. 243
In addition, the Council determined that certain sanctions
against the Taliban should also be extended to certain Afghan
entities.244 Next, the UN recognized the political relevance of the
Taliban by inviting it to negotiations the UN were promoting in
Afghanistan, and the Council regretted the Taliban’s decision to
withdraw from them.245 Fifth, the Council requested in
Resolution 1333 (2000) that the Taliban comply with
international conventions, such as the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 Convention against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.246 And
finally, the Council tacitly accepted (in Chapter VII resolutions)
the existence of diplomatic relations between the Taliban and
States by urging those States to reduce the number and level of
staff in Taliban missions and control their movement,247 and by
ordering States to restrict the entry or transit of “all senior
officials of the rank of Deputy Minister or higher in the
Taliban . . . and other senior advisors and dignitaries of the
Taliban . . . .”248
Each of these factors is relevant for the purpose of
categorizing the Taliban as a public authority, but two deserve
particular attention. First, the Council’s order to the Taliban to
comply with international conventions; and second, the
extension by the Council of sanctions against the Taliban to
242. REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL:
SUPPLEMENT 1996–99, supra note 170, Chapter XI at 11116.
243. See S.C. Res. 1193, supra note 236, pmbl. ¶ 8; S.C. Res. 1214, supra note
237, pmbl. ¶ 10. The word “measure” is often used in international law as
referring to States’ and international organizations’ actions. It is not used to
allude to those of purely non-State actors. Examples of the former abound. See,
e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 14, 41; GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1B, art. XXVIII(1), 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167
(1994); DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and
Proceedings Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, art. 12,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994); Adoption of the Paris Agreement,
annex, art. 12, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 (Dec. 12, 2015).
244. See Rep. of S.C., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/2 (2001–2002).
245. See Rep. of S.C., at 458, U.N. Doc. A/54/2 (1998–1999).
246. See S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 93, pmbl. ¶ 8.
247. See id. ¶ 7.
248. Id. ¶ 14.
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Afghan entities shows that, for the UN organ, there was not a
clear cut distinction, in practical terms, between the Taliban and
the given public Afghan entities. The Taliban, as a non-State
actor, could not be demanded to comply with the said treaties.
In effect, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances
provides rights and obligations for “the Parties,” not non-State
actors,249 as does the Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.250 The fact that
the Taliban regime is in fact Afghanistan for the purpose of the
Conventions is the underlying basis of the Security Council’s
order. These facts reveal that, for the Council at the time of the
9/11 attack, the Taliban regime had, by virtue of its operation, a

249. Article 25.1 of the Convention, titled Procedure for Admission,
Signature, Ratification and Accession, sets forth:
Members of the United Nations, States not Members of the United
Nations which are members of a specialized agency of the United
Nations or of the International Atomic Energy Agency or Parties to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, and any other State
invited by the Council, may become Parties to this Convention.
Convention on Psychotropic Substances art. 25.1, Feb. 21, 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S.
175.
250. Article 26 provides:
This Convention shall be open for signature . . . by:
a) All States;
b) Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia;
c) Regional economic integration organizations which have
competence in respect of the negotiation, conclusion and application of
international agreements in matters covered by this Convention,
references under the Convention to Parties, States or national services
being applicable to these organizations within the limits of their
competence.
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances art. 26, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95.
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public character.251 All this took place before 9/11. Afterwards,
no similar language was used.252
It has been shown that a new standard of attribution in the
realm of terrorism started to be crafted by the Council in five
resolutions prior to Resolution 1373. The specific standard of
attribution in the domain of terrorism has been subsequently
and explicitly reaffirmed and expanded several times from 2002
to 2016, with particular intensity after the emergence of ISIL. In
effect, the operative part 2(a) of Resolution 1373 has explicitly
been reaffirmed in the operative or the preambular parts of
Resolutions 2133 (2014), 253 2170 (2014),254 2199 (2015),255 and
2214 (2015)256 (the latter three being Chapter VII decisions), and
in the presidential statements of September 27, 2010,257 May 2,

251. It is important to mention that, although the Taliban ruled Afghanistan
from 1996 to 2001, it was not recognized as the official government by the
United Nations. The official Afghan government opposed the Taliban and was
a strong supporter of the measures against it before 9/11, mainly Security
Council Resolution 1267 (1999). See REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1996–99, supra note 170, Chapter XI at 1123.
It seems paradoxical that, despite the fact that the Taliban were not the
recognized Afghan government, private acts could be attributed to the Taliban
as public Afghan authorities. However, as the International Law Commission
has expressed:
The question of attribution of conduct to the State for the purposes of
responsibility is to be distinguished from other international law
processes by which particular organs are authorized to enter into
commitments on behalf of the State. Thus the Head of State or
Government or the minister of foreign affairs is regarded as having
authority to represent the State without any need to produce full
powers. Such rules have nothing to do with attribution for the
purposes of State responsibility. In principle, the State’s responsibility
is engaged by conduct incompatible with its international obligations,
irrespective of the level of administration or government at which the
conduct occurs.
Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 230, at 39, cmt. 5.
252. It is important to mention that, prior to taking the Afghan capital in
September 1996, the Taliban was mainly a non-State actor receiving strong
support from, but not under the control of, Pakistan. For a detailed history of
the Taliban in the context of the history of Afghanistan over the last 40 years,
see William Maley, The Foreign Policy of the Taliban, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL., http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/foreign-policy-taliban/p8609 (last updated
Feb. 10, 2016).
253. See S.C. Res. 2133, supra note 138, ¶ 1.
254. See S.C. Res. 2170, supra note 143, ¶ 11.
255. See S.C. Res. 2199, supra note 58.
256. See S.C. Res. 2214, supra note 153, pmbl. ¶ 8.
257. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2010/19, supra note 123, ¶ 17.
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2011, 258 and May 11, 2016.259 On the other hand, operative part
2(c) of Resolution 1373 was also reaffirmed in the operative part
of Resolution 1566 (2004), a Chapter VII decision,260 and
Resolution 1624 (2005),261 and also in the presidential
statements of September 27, 2010,262 and of May 4, 2011.263
These subsequent decisions added a new element to the abovementioned provision of Resolution 1373: as part of the duty to
deny safe haven, members must prosecute or extradite persons
who support, facilitate, participate or attempt to participate in
the financing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist
acts.264
What are the general contents of the standard of attribution
that the Security Council has crafted in the domain of terrorism?
From the above-mentioned set of Resolutions and Presidential
Statements from 1998 to 2015, the contents of the standard can
be so defined: terrorist acts carried out by non-State actors that
reach the threshold of armed attacks and that take place as a
result of a given State’s instigation, assistance, participation, or
active or passive support will be attributed to the said State for
the purpose of self-defensive action under Article 51. In addition,
armed terrorist acts committed, financed, facilitated, incited,
prepared, or planned by individuals who had been previously
identified, whose prosecution and punishment or extradition to
a State have been unsuccessfully required by others or the
Security Council, will be attributed to the passive State for the
foregoing purpose.
A final question is whether a Security Council’s previous
decision declaring that a UN member is actively or passively
supporting terrorism, or has failed to prosecute or extradite
individuals accused of participating in the different phases of
terrorist acts, is required as a pre-condition to attribute armed
terrorist attacks to the supportive State. The answer should be
no. The events of 9/11 led to the only occasion in which the
Council attributed an armed terrorist attack to a State: the

258. S.C. Pres. Statement 2011/9, supra note 128, ¶ 7.
259. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2016/6, ¶ 7 (May 11, 2016).
260. See S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 38, ¶ 2.
261. See S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 100, pmbl. ¶ 15, ¶ 2.
262. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2010/19, supra note 123, ¶ 13.
263. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2012/17, supra note 133, ¶ 11.
264. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 38, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 1624, supra note
100, pmbl. ¶ 15; S.C. Res. 2170, supra note 143, ¶ 5; S.C. Pres. Statement
2010/19, supra note 123, ¶ 13.
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Taliban and Afghanistan. This was preceded by explicit
Council’s condemnations in Resolutions 1214 (1998) and 1267
(1999).265 However, the text of the Resolutions and Presidential
Statements in which the special standard of attribution has been
established does not impose such a pre-condition.
It could be claimed that the fact that the set of resolutions
adopted by the Council after 2002 reaffirms States’ obligation to
deny safe haven to terrorists and to avoid active or passive
support to terrorist groups without expressly affirming the right
to self-defense, as the Council did in Resolution 1373, would
mean that such support to terrorist groups would just entail a
violation of the resolutions but not trigger Article 51. To respond,
it can be said that once a non-State actor’s action, which qualifies
as an armed attack, is attributed to a State on the basis of the
support given by the latter to the former, the applicability of
Article 51 becomes directly possible. There is no need for a
specific reaffirmation of the right in the Council’s resolutions
setting forth the particular test of attribution.
The differences between the Council’s specific standard of
attribution in the realm of terrorism and the standard of
attribution under customary international law are important.
The Council requires neither evidence of effective control by a
State of the non-State actor when carrying out the given armed
attack nor the State’s effective instructions to do so. Thus, active
or passive support that has made the armed attack possible is
enough to attribute to the supporting State the terrorist armed
attack. The Council’s standard of attribution catches much more
private actions than that of customary international law and, for
this reason, significantly expands the scope of the lawful
invocation of the right to self-defense against terrorist armed
attacks.
X. THE NOTION OF ARMED ATTACKS IN THE
SECURITY COUNCIL’S DECISIONS RELATED
TO TERRORISM FROM 2002 TO 2015
The preceding sections of this Article have shown that there
is no subsequent practice by the Security Council on the right to
self-defense against autonomous non-State actors from 2002 to
2015, save the important but exceptional Resolution 2249. On
the contrary, there have been decisions by the Council that set
265. See supra notes 233–36 and accompanying text.
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forth a special standard of attribution to States of non-State
actors’ actions in the domain of threats to international peace
and security caused by terrorist acts. These two elements
combined suggest that the existence of a terrorist attack against
a State that could qualify as an armed attack is not in itself
enough to trigger self-defensive actions under Article 51. The
self-defensive action needs to be attributed to a State under the
Council’s test of attribution or, if this is not the case, have the
innocent State’s consent to the self-defensive operation or—after
Resolution 2249—the Council’s endorsement or a Chapter VII
authorization.
As shown above, the Security Council has condemned
terrorist attacks in 12 resolutions and 32 presidential
statements.266 Never, however, has the Council explicitly
labelled the terrorist acts as “armed attacks.” For instance, the
Council used the words “horrifying terrorist attacks”267 in
Resolution 1368, and “terrorist attacks” in Resolution 1373,
Resolution 1390 (2002), and Resolution 1516 (2003).268 The
Council also used the expression “bomb attacks” in Resolutions
1438 (2002) and Resolution 1465 (2002),269 “terrorist bomb
attack” in Resolution 1450 (2002),270 and “shameless and horrific
attacks” in Resolution 1618.271 In recent months, ISIL’s actions
have been labeled by the Council as “attacks” in the Presidential
Statement of January 10, 2014,272 “large-scale offensive” in the
Presidential Statement of September 19, 2014,273 and both
“criminal terrorist acts” and “terrorist acts” in Resolution 2170
(2014).274
Nonetheless, the lack of the term “armed attack” does not
mean that a terrorist attack cannot be regarded as an armed
attack attributed to a State by the Council. As was shown, the
9/11 attacks were regarded by the Council as armed attacks in
its Presidential Statement of September 11, 2002, since the selfdefensive action was deemed by the Council as carried out in
266. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.
267. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 6, ¶ 1.
268. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 45, pmbl. ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 80,
pmbl. ¶ 4; S.C. Res. 1516, supra note 89, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 1530, supra note 96, ¶ 2;
S.C. Res. 1611, supra note 102, ¶ 1.
269. S.C. Res. 1438, supra note 83, ¶ 1; S.C. Res. 1465, supra note 89, ¶ 1.
270. S.C. Res. 1450, supra note 83, ¶ 1.
271. S.C. Res. 1618, supra note 103, ¶ 2.
272. S.C. Pres. Statement 2014/1, supra note 147.
273. S.C. Pres. Statement, 2014/20, ¶ 4 (Sept. 19 2014).
274. See S.C. Res. 2170, supra note 143, pmbl. ¶ 5, ¶ 1.
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defense of “common values and common security.”275 The selfdefensive operation was lawful, so inevitably the 9/11 terrorist
attack met the threshold of an armed attack. In addition,
although the Council labelled ISIL’s actions as “continued gross
systematic and widespread attacks,”276 the Council, for all
practical purposes, regarded them as armed attacks by calling
upon UN members to take any necessary measure, the use of
force in self-defense included. The Council retains the power to
make such calls even if the terrorist attack or threat is not
explicitly deemed as an armed attack.277
However, the Presidential Statement of September 11,
2002, and Resolution 2249, do not imply that the existence of a
terrorist armed attack, on its own, can serve as the sole basis for
the invocation of Article 51. Neither can it be said that the use
of the word “attack” by the Council in association with a terrorist
attack in itself, and without evidence of attribution to a State,
opens the door for lawful self-defensive actions, as some have
suggested recently.278 As has been stated, nothing in the
decisions and practices of the Council from 2002 to 2015
supports this wide view.
XI.

THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST
AUTONOMOUS NON-STATE ACTORS
OPERATING FROM UNABLE BUT WILLING
STATES

Fourteen months before Resolution 2249, the United States
invoked Article 51 in support of Iraq, and in so doing claimed
that Syria’s consent was not required because it had lost control
of significant portions of its territory.279 A similar approach was
embraced later by the United Kingdom.280 There is no need to
275. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
276. See S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 59, pmbl. ¶ 5.
277. See e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 24, 36, 39, 48, 51.
278. See Marc Weller, Striking ISIL: Aspects of the Law on the Use of Force,
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.: INSTIGHTS (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.asil.org/insights/
volume/19/issue/5/striking-isil-aspects-law-use-force.
279. See supra note 56.
280. The British Prime Minister expressed in November 2015, when
explaining why UK should expand its mission in Syria:
Isil is not just present in Iraq. It operates across the border in Syria, a
border that is meaningless to it because as far as Isil is concerned this
is all one space. It is in Syria, in Raqqa, that Isil has its headquarters.
It is from Raqqa that some of the main threats against this country
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make this type of argument when the innocent State is willing
to offer consent for the military action against the autonomous
non-State actor operating in its territory, as was the case with
Syria.281 The fact that the innocent State lacks effective control
over the territory from which the autonomous non-State actors
operate does not mean that the territory has legally ceased to
belong to the said State for the purpose of the principles of
sovereignty and territorial integrity under the UN Charter.282
Neither Resolutions 1368 nor 1373 (nor any of the other 37
resolutions and 48 presidential statements issued by the Council
from 2002 to 2015 in relation to terrorist acts as threats to
international peace and security) support the view that, in the
event of an armed attack by an autonomous non-State actor that
cannot be attributed to a State under the Council’s standard, the
affected State does not need the innocent State’s consent,283
much less that the former can disregard the latter’s offer of
consent to proceed to respond on its own terms. As with the
Assad regime, the fact that consent was politically difficult for
States invoking Article 51 in light of the substantial human
rights abuses carried out by the willing State284 is not legally
are planned and orchestrated. Raqqa, if you like, is the head of the
snake.
Nicholas Watt, Cameron Announces Plan for Commons Vote on Syria Airstrikes,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/17/
david-cameron-plan-commons-vote-syria-airstrikes.
281. Syria expressed this willingness. Its Foreign Minister stated, “Syria is
ready to cooperate and coordinate on the regional and international level in the
war on terror[.] . . . But any effort to combat terrorism should be coordinated
with the Syrian government.” Liz Sly, Syria Warns Against U.S. Strikes on
Islamic State on its Soil, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/world/middle_east/syria-warns-against-strikes-on-islamic-state-onits-soil/2014/08/25/6fe98b38-2c5d-11e4-994d202962a9150c_story.html?tid=pm_world_pop. The fact that the offer was an
attempt to rein in the opposition and to gain legitimacy internally and
internationally does not deprive the offer of its legal significance under the
Charter to ensure the territorial integrity of Syria. Differently put, nothing in
the decisions and practice of the Security Council in the domain of terrorism
suggest that the political motivations of the unable but willing State can
prevent a self-defending State from requiring its consent.
282. See U.N. Charter, art. 2.4. See in this regard, Albrecht Randelzhofer &
Oliver Dörr, Article 2 (4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. A
COMMENTARY. 3d ed. VOL. I 200, 216–17 (Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan,
Georg Nolte & Andreas Paulus eds., 2012).
283. Recent events may be creating another evolution: the existence of the
obligation to request consent in the event of failed States. This is a topic to be
fully explored in the future.
284. The UN General Assembly, for instance, declared:
Deplores and condemns in the strongest terms the continued armed
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relevant; there is no international law or rule establishing an
exception to the principle of the territorial integrity of the unable
but willing State for this reason.
State practice highlighted by members of the Council
provides evidence of this important consent requirement in
operations against autonomous non-State actors operating
within unable but willing States. For instance, in February 2015
the members of the Council condemned Boko Haram attacks
against Chadian soldiers in the border between Cameroon and
Nigeria, expressing:
The members of the Security Council noted that the
Chadian military counter-attack against Boko Haram
into Nigerian territory was conducted with the consent
and the collaboration of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
whose territorial integrity remained intact.285
XII.

POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE LACK
OF EXPLICIT SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS AND
PRACTICE ENLARGING ARTICLE 51 TO COVER
AUTONOMOUS NON-STATE ACTORS IN
GENERAL

This Article has shown that there has not been any explicit
subsequent decision by the Council in relation to the expansion
of Article 51 to cover armed attacks by any autonomous nonState actor, with the exception of ISIL and ANF. Finally, we
address possible explanations for the Council’s stand. The first
explanation is that 13 years of decision-making by the Council
on threats to international peace and security caused by
terrorist acts have brought about a vast multilateral framework
whose operation in international domestic spheres is closely
monitored by the Council, and including: (i) an indirect, but
significant, expansion of Article 51 through the specific test of
violence by the Syrian authorities against its own people since the
beginning of the peaceful protests in 2011, and demands that the
Syrian authorities immediately put an end to all indiscriminate
attacks in civilian areas and public spaces, including those involving
the use of terror tactics, airstrikes, barrel and vacuum bombs,
chemical weapons and heavy artillery.
Rep. of the S.C., ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/70/L.47 (Nov. 2, 2015).
285. Press Release, Security Council, Boko Haram Attacks Against Chadian
Troops and Civilians alongside Border between Cameroon and Nigeria, U.N.
Press Release SC/11768-AFR/3070 (Feb. 5, 2015).
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attribution in this realm; and (ii) the exceptional endorsement
to act in self-defense, among other necessary measures, against
mainly a single autonomous non-State actor, i.e. ISIL. The
Council and its 73 members have reached agreement on these
three strategies, which constitute in themselves outstanding
developments in international law. The fact that the Council has
not extended Article 51 even more does not necessarily mean
that aggrieved States are left unprotected in legal terms, since
consent from the State from which the autonomous actor is
operating can be obtained before or even after the self-defensive
action.
The second explanation is that, while some prominent
members may be claiming the right to self-defense against
autonomous non-State actors, they have not been able to carry
the Council with them, as the situation regarding ISIL reveals.
The permanent members disagree over the general applicability
of Article 51 in the absence of consent from the State from which
the non-State actors operate. As previously stated, China and
Russia did not endorse U.S. operations in Syria without Syrian
consent.286 Thus, a permanent member unilaterally invoked the
right, but the Council did not support it, owing to the exercise of
a veto power by one of its other permanent members.
Finally, the Council surely is not unaware of the risk for
international peace and security that the recognition of the right
to self-defense against autonomous non-State actors sometimes
poses. A threat to international peace prompted by an
autonomous non-State actor involves the actor and a State. After
the self-defensive State has acted without the innocent State’s
consent, there is a new risk to international peace and security
caused by the actual or potential reaction by the latter State
against the self-defending State. In other words, in the present
author´s view, the invocation of Article 51 may lead to higher,
not lower, risks to international peace and security. Thus, the
indirect expansion of Article 51, combined with the multilateral
framework, the different perspectives among the permanent
members, the risks to international peace and security that the
right to self-defense against autonomous non-State actors would
involve may explain the Council’s decision to not promote a right
of this character.

286. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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XIII.

CONCLUSION

This Article has illustrated that in order to address the
threat to international peace and security caused by terrorist
acts, the Security Council developed three strategies between
the years of 2001 to 2015. The first is a large multilateral scheme
based on UN members’ cooperation and compliance with the
Council’s decisions on terrorism. Second, through the design of a
specific test of attribution to States of non-State actors’ actions
in the realm of terrorism, the Council indirectly expanded
Article 51. This test is notably less strict than its corollary in
customary international law. Thus, the expansion through the
Council’s subsequent decisions and practices has taken place
within the traditional structure of Article 51, and attribution to
a State of the terrorist attack remains as a fundamental
requirement for the invocation of Article 51 by self-defending
States, even more so when such attribution has been freed from
the strict criteria of customary international law. The third
strategy, and the latest to come into play, is the call upon UN
members to adopt “all necessary measures” to deal with a
particular autonomous non-State actor, ISIL being the first
group subject to this new element. It remains to be seen whether
or not the Council will resort to this type of decision in relation
to other autonomous groups in the future. The Security Council’s
decisions and practices over the given time period do not
contemplate an inherent right to self-defense against
autonomous non-State actors.
Article 51 remains, in the field of threats to international
peace and security caused by terrorist groups, in a process of
evolution pushed by the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, and their closest allies. However, although the process
in the Security Council has gone a very long way, its decisions
have not expanded Article 51 to the point that these States have
individually claimed.
“He had the right, since he had the might,” says the narrator
in WAR AND PEACE, referring to Napoleon.287 Thirteen years of
the Security Council’s decisions subsequent to 9/11 have passed,
and Tolstoy’s words are not yet totally true for the said States in
relation to Article 51 and autonomous non-State actors.

287. LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE 1587 (1869).

